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Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings
and the Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf
John E. Noyes*

ABSTRACT

This Article explores when international third-party
dispute settlement forums may hear cases concerning the outer
limits of a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
articulated determinate rules for establishing those limits and
created an institution-the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf-to make recommendations concerning them.
Limits set by coastal states "on the basis of" such
recommendations "shall be final and binding." Yet the Law of
the Sea Convention's third-party dispute settlement system may
also apply to outer limits questions concerning the Arctic Ocean
and other oceans.
International courts and tribunals are likely to play only
limited roles in reviewing a coastal state's compliance with the
substantive and procedural requirements of the Law of the Sea
Convention related to the outer limits of its continental shelf.
Rules about jurisdiction and standing, and the need to accord
appropriate deference to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, will restrict the cases that may be pursued.
Although third-party tribunals might issue occasional advisory
opinions or rulings in contentious interstate cases, helping to
settle disputes or promote consistent and accurate applicationof
the law, alternative mechanisms will often have to further these
goals.

* Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; President,
American Branch of the International Law Association; Member, International Law
Association Committee on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf. Thanks to
Thomas Barton, Miguel Garcia, Vladimir Jareg, and Alex G. Oude Elferink for their
valuable comments on a draft of this article or for answering questions related to it,
and to Cavan Cox and Omar Nassar for their helpful research assistance. Thanks also
to the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw, who added several new
sources and parentheticals to the footnotes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the
Convention)1 helps establish the rule of law for the oceans. The
Convention includes a third-party dispute settlement system,
authorizing international courts and tribunals to authoritatively
interpret Convention norms in many issue areas. 2 This system may
also further goals such as the peaceful settlement of disputes.
This Article explores instances in which international thirdparty dispute settlement forums may hear contentious cases or
render advisory opinions concerning the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines. 3 The Law
of the Sea Convention includes determinate rules for establishing
those limits. 4 The Convention also created an institution specifically
to address outer limits. 5 This technical body, the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), makes recommendations
concerning outer limits "in accordance with article 76" of the
Convention 6; limits set by coastal states "on the basis of' those
recommendations "shall be final and binding. '7 Yet the Convention's
third-party dispute settlement system may also apply to outer limits
questions concerning the Arctic Ocean and other oceans. This Article
examines the challenges involved in subjecting outer limits disputes
or advisory opinion requests to third-party review.
Part II of this Article introduces the third-party dispute
settlement system of the Convention and highlights its various
functions, including promotion of the rule of law. Part III then
surveys the Convention's provisions on the outer limits of the
continental shelf and the roles of the CLCS. These two Parts provide
a framework for Part IV, which considers when international courts
and tribunals may review a coastal state's compliance with or give
advice about the substantive and procedural requirements of the
Convention with respect to the outer limits of the continental shelf.
International courts and tribunals will likely play limited roles with

1.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. As of July 15, 2009, there were 159 parties
to the Convention, including the European Community and all major developed states
except the United States. The Convention is to be interpreted and applied together
with the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement], as a single instrument.
2.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 186-91, 279-99, Annexes II, IV-IX.
3.
This Article focuses on the regime concerning the outer limits of the
continental shelf that is contained in the widely accepted Law of the Sea Convention,
and on related third-party dispute settlement options-primarily those available
pursuant to the Convention. The Article addresses issues related to the outer limits
beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, not the situations in which states may have
only a 200-mile continental shelf limit.
4.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(4).
5.
Id. art. 76(8).
6.
Id. Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
7.
Id. art. 76(8).
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respect to this issue.
Political considerations may restrict the
submission of cases, and judges face restrictive rules about
jurisdiction and standing.
Although third-party tribunals may
occasionally render advisory opinions or decide contentious interstate
cases-thus helping to settle disputes or promote consistent and
accurate application of the law related to outer limits-alternative
mechanisms will often have to further these goals.

II.

THIRD-PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

Negotiators at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III) believed that compulsory third-party
dispute settlement was an essential part of the Law of the Sea
Convention. The Convention contains elaborate provisions for thirdparty dispute settlement, which are summarized in Part II.A. Part
II.B then discusses several functions of courts and tribunals
operating under these provisions, emphasizing the notion of rule of
8
law promotion.
A. The Third-PartyDispute Settlement System of the

Law of the Sea Convention
The negotiations at UNCLOS III led to the establishment of a
complex third-party dispute settlement system, which is contained in
Part XI, Part XV, and several Annexes of the Law of the Sea
Convention. 9 The provisions applicable to deep seabed mining
disputes differ significantly from those applicable to non-seabedmining disputes.' 0
With respect to many non-seabed-mining

8.
For overviews of the Law of the Sea Convention's system of third-party
dispute settlement and discussion of reasons for this system, see generally A.O. ADEDE,
THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFTING HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1987); MIGUEL
GARCiA GARCIA-REVILLO, EL TRIBUNAL INTERNACIONAL DEL DERECHO DEL MAR:
ORIGEN, ORGANIZACOIN Y COMPETENCIAS [THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW
OF THE SEA: ORIGIN, ORGANIZATION AND LEGAL AUTHORITY] 291-420 (2005) (Spain);
J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 182-210 (4th ed. 2005); E.D.
Brown, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea: The UN Convention Regime, 21
MARINE POL'Y 17 (1997); Lucius C. Caflisch, The Settlement of Disputes Relating to
Activities in the InternationalSeabed Area, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 303 (Christos
L. Rozakis & Constantine A. Stephanou eds., 1983); John E. Noyes, Compulsory ThirdParty Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4
CONN. J. INT'L L. 675 (1989); Louis B. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean
Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 2, at 195
(1983); Louis B. Sohn, U.S. Policy Toward the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes, 17
VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1976). For an extensive bibliography, see INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE
LAW OF THE SEA, SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES CONCERNING
THE LAW OF THE SEA (2009), http://www.itlos.org/documents-publications/documents/
ITLOS%20 Bibliography%2013%20May2009.pdf.
9.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 186-91, 279-99, Annexes II, IV-IX.
10.
The International Court of Justice has defined a dispute as "a disagreement
on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views of interests between parties .... In
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disputes, Part XV of the Convention authorizes comprehensive
These
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions."l
procedures apply when informal mechanisms do not lead to the
settlement of disputes. 12
The third-party dispute settlement system articulated in Part
XV is flexible. States may choose among: the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (a court created by the Convention);
the International Court of Justice (ICJ); Annex VII arbitration; or, for
disputes relating to fisheries, the marine environment, marine
scientific research, or navigation, Annex VIII special arbitration
Each such court and tribunal has
before technical experts. 13
jurisdiction "over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of th[e] [Law of the Sea] Convention which is submitted to
it in accordance with this Part" or "over any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to
the purposes of th[e] Convention, which is submitted to it in
accordance with the agreement."'1 4 Furthermore, states are free to
15
agree on other formal or informal dispute settlement mechanisms.
Despite this flexibility in choice of forum, the Convention's thirdparty dispute settlement provisions remain compulsory and can lead
to binding decisions, with arbitration serving as the default
mechanism in non-seabed-mining cases when all parties to a dispute
16
do not agree on an same alternative forum.
Most contentious non-seabed-mining third-party cases brought
under Part XV will be interstate cases. The European Community,
which has accepted the Convention, may be a party to cases in the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VII arbitral
tribunals, or Annex VIII special arbitral tribunals, but not to cases in
the International Court of Justice. 17 The Convention restricts the
access of other international organizations and individuals to thirdparty forums,' 8 a point developed more fully in Part IV.
The Law of the Sea Convention restricts the scope of compulsory
procedures entailing binding decisions by providing for several
These limitations relate to certain
limitations and exceptions.

order to establish the existence of a dispute, 'It must be shown that the claim of one
party is positively opposed by the other."' East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90,
99-100 (June 30) (quoting South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),
Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319, 328 (Dec. 21)).
11.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 286-96.
Id. art. 281.
12.
13.
Id. art. 287.
14.
Id. art. 288.
15.
Id. arts. 280-82.
16.
Id. art. 287(3), (5).
17.
See id. arts. 2(2), 291(2), 305(1)(f); id. Annex VI, art. 20; id. Annex VII, art.
13; id. Annex VIII, art. 4; id. Annex IX, arts. 1, 7; Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 35, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at
ICJ
[hereinafter
http://www.icj.cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0
Statute].
18.
LOS Convention, supranote 1, art. 291.
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disputes concerning marine scientific research and exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) fishing disputes. 19
States Parties to the
Convention may also file declarations opting out of the Convention's
third-party dispute settlement requirements with respect to a few
matters. These optional exceptions apply to maritime boundary
delimitations, historic bays, military activities, certain EEZ law
enforcement activities, and instances when the United Nations
Security Council is exercising its assigned functions. 20 None of these
limitations or optional exceptions applies directly to disputes
21
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf.
With respect to contentious cases relating to seabed mining in
"the Area," i.e., the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, 22 the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS is the
primary third-party dispute settlement forum.2 3 The Chamber,
composed of eleven of the twenty-one members of the ITLOS, has
jurisdiction with respect to "activities in the Area ' 24 in cases
involving certain disputes between: States Parties to the Law of the
Sea Convention; a State Party and the International Seabed
Authority; parties to a mining contract, which may include natural or
juridical persons; and the Authority and prospective contractors,
25
which may include natural or juridical persons.

19.
Id. art. 297.
20.
Id. art. 298. For the text of declarations, see U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs &
the Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention agreements/convention.declarations.htm. For a good overview of
the Part XV limitations and optional exceptions, see generally Tullio Treves, The
Jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 111, 118-20 (P. Chandrasekhara
Rao & Rahmatullah Khan eds., 2001). Most parties to the Law of the Sea Convention
have not invoked the optional exceptions. Annex VII arbitral tribunals have decided
maritime boundary delimitation disputes between States Parties that have not invoked
the maritime boundary delimitation exception. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf (Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago), 27 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 147
(Annex
VII
Arb.
2006),
available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/
volXXVII/147-251.pdf; Delimitation of Maritime Boundary (Guy. v. Surin.) (Annex VII
Arb. 2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-Suriname%20 Award.pdf.
21.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 297-98 (listing the limitations and
optional exceptions to the applicability of Part XV, Section 2: Compulsory Procedures
Entailing Binding Decisions).
22.
Id. art. 1(1).
23.
Id. arts. 186-91.
24.
"Activities in the Area" are defined as "all activities of exploration for, and
exploitation of, the resources of the Area." Id. art. 1(3). "Resources" are in turn defined,
for purposes of Part XI of the Convention (relating to the Area), as "all solid, liquid or
gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including
polymetallic nodules." Id. art. 133(a).
25.
Id. art. 187. See also GUDMUNDUR EIRIKSSON, THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 129-33 (2000) (outlining the jurisdiction of the
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS "with respect to activities in the International
Seabed Area"); Treves, supra note 20, at 124-27 (discussing the Chamber's jurisdiction
with respect to disputes concerning "activities in the Area"). For more extensive
analyses, see generally SAID MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING 287-302,
304-05, 340 (1987); NIELS-J. SEEBERG-ELVERFELDT, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
DEEP SEABED MINING (1998); Caflisch, supra note 8.
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Some of the international courts and tribunals that can hear
contentious law of the sea cases may also render advisory opinions.
The ICJ may do so, with respect to any legal question, at the request
of the U.N. General Assembly or the U.N. Security Council. 2 6 Parties
to an international agreement related to the purposes of the Law of
the Sea Convention may authorize the ITLOS to issue an advisory
opinion. 27 When the Assembly or Council of the International Seabed
Authority requests an advisory opinion to address "legal questions
arising within the scope of their activities," the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the ITLOS "shall give" an advisory opinion, 28 and the
Assembly may request the Chamber to provide an advisory opinion
"on the conformity with th[e] [Law of the Sea] Convention of a
proposal before the Assembly on any matter. ' 29 Part IV of this
Article examines more closely these mechanisms and how they apply
to questions about the legality of outer limits determinations.
B. The Functions of Third-PartyDispute Settlement and
the Rule of Law
Courts and tribunals deciding law of the sea matters may serve a
variety of functions. They may decide on provisional measures, in
order to preserve the status quo or help manage crises, pending a
final determination on the merits.30 The ITLOS also decides "prompt
release" applications-making narrow rulings concerning the prompt
release, in limited circumstances, of a vessel and its crew on the
posting of a reasonable bond 3 1-to eliminate a source of friction and
uphold individual rights before a decision on the underlying merits of
a broader dispute. 3 2 The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS
may act as a constitutional court or, upon agreement by the parties, a
33
commercial arbitral body.

26.
U.N. Charter art. 96, para. a; ICJ Statute supra note 17, art. 65.
27.
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Rules of the Tribunal, Doc.
ITLOS/8 (2001), art. 138(1), available at http://www.itlos.org/documents-publications/
documents/Itlos%208%20E%2017%2003%2009.pdf [hereinafter ITLOS Rules].
28.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 191.
29.
Id. art. 159(10).
30.
Id. art. 290; ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 41. See SHABTAI ROSENNE,
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 218-25 (2005).

31.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 292. Although a variety of courts and
tribunals in theory may consider prompt release applications, the ITLOS has residuary
compulsory jurisdiction over them and has heard all such applications.
32.
For discussion of the economic, humanitarian, safety, and environmental
concerns accommodated by the Convention's prompt release provisions, see Bernard H.
Oxman, Observations on Vessel Release under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 11 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 201, 203-04 (1996).
33.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 187-89 (explaining the jurisdiction
of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in contentious cases); MAEMOUDI, supra note 25, at
296-300; John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 164-72 (1998) (examining the Seabed Disputes Chamber's role
as a "constitutional" court).
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Most generally, the Law of the Sea Convention's third-party
dispute settlement system was negotiated to help resolve disputes
peacefully and to authoritatively interpret and apply the rules agreed
on in the Convention.3 4 Proactive judicial measures may complement
the general undertaking of courts and tribunals to resolve disputes
peacefully. 35 Although a decision by a court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention "shall have
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular dispute," 36 an impartial third-party decision interpreting a
Convention provision may guide other actors and encourage
consistent and accurate application of that provision.3 7
The
Convention's third-party dispute settlement system may, in short,
promote the rule of law as well as contribute to the settlement of
disputes. Practical international lawyers recognize these goals while
cautioning against over-optimism in predicting what third-party
38
dispute settlement may achieve.
The "rule of law" to which the Convention's dispute settlement
system may contribute deserves some elaboration. The concept is
much debated, and some use the phrase to promote particular

34.
See Bernard H. Oxman, Tribute to Louis Sohn-Is the Dispute Settlement
System Under the Law of the Sea Convention Working?, 29 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
655, 659-60 (2007).
35.
See L.D.M. Nelson, The Jurisprudenceof the InternationalTribunal for the
Law of the Sea: Some Observations, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 967, 981-82 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Riidiger Wolfrum eds.,
2007) (noting several instances in which the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea "has taken fully into account the necessity to prescribe practical measures which
would assist the parties to find a solution, utilizing its powers under the rules of
procedure (article 89, paragraph 5) to prescribe measures other than those requested"
(emphasis added)). The fundamental obligation to settle disputes peacefully is
articulated in Articles 2(3) and 33 of the U.N. Charter and in Article 279 of the Law of
the Sea Convention.
36.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 296(2). Accord id. Annex VI, art. 33(2);
ICJ Statute, supranote 17, art. 59.
37.
International courts and tribunals operating under the Law of the Sea
Convention may also effectively act as courts of equity in limited circumstances. Ex
aequo et bono authority is available in theory, see LOS Convention, supra note 1, art.
293(2) (granting the court or tribunal the ability to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the
parties consent), but has not been invoked in practice. In maritime delimitation cases,
the applicable law refers to the need "to achieve an equitable solution." Id. arts. 74, 83.
38.

The inclusion of a measure of compulsory jurisdiction, despite the latter's
admitted problems and limitations, may in certain instances improve the
climate for negotiations. In some others, it may either curb the
temptation to take unilateral actions or rely overly upon arguments
based on national sovereignty, or provide an additional option in the
diplomatic management of a dispute, even if the eventual decision does
not, in fact, settle it (as is often the case). In circumstances where
jurisdiction is confined to the "optional" or "consent-based," experience
shows that consent is withheld more often than not, usually at some cost
to the rule of law.

David Anderson, Book Review, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 499, 503 (2006).
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concepts of justice or to mask forms of oppression. 39 As an ideal,
however, the rule of law captures important values. The modern
ideal of the rule of law developed primarily in the context of
Western-especially liberal democratic-domestic legal systems that
established a vertical relationship between sovereigns and their
citizens, rather than in an international legal context. 40 In the
domestic context, the rule of law captures the notion that the power of
the state must not be exercised arbitrarily (evidencing a concern with
prospective, accessible, and transparent rule application) and must
apply to all without discrimination (evidencing a concern with
general and consistent application). In domestic legal systems, the
rule of law proscribes arbitrary sovereign exercises of power; the law
should apply to and constrain the state and its agents. 4 1 Some
commentators take the view that independent courts with impartial
judges are, in domestic legal systems, an essential component of the
42
rule of law.
It is difficult to apply one vision of the rule of law to the entire
international system, in part because the structure of international
legal regimes varies dramatically. 43 In some international contexts
where rule of law principles have been articulated, international legal
norms apply to individuals, the actions of international organizations
or states operating within those organizations directly affect
individuals, and independent tribunals regularly hear cases involving
individuals. 44 These contexts parallel domestic settings in which rule
of law principles have been articulated. Yet, in situations where

39.
See Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF
RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN
COUNTRIES, FRANCE, AND THE U.S. 1, 1 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).

40.
See Simon Chesterman, An InternationalRule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
331, 333-40 (2008) (tracing the evolution of the concept of the rule of law).
41.
In contrast, "rule by law" describes states that use law to govern but do not
accept that law binds the state and state actors. Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 2.
42.
See Robert S. Summers, The Principlesof the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1691, 1694 (1999).
43.
Variation appears, inter alia, in the extent to which international legal
regimes embody roles for institutions, the independence of those institutions, the
subjects addressed by various legal regimes, the determinacy of applicable legal norms,
and how much freedom of action those norms accord to major powers or hegemons. For
efforts to address the meaning of the rule of law in the international law realm, see
generally, IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1998);
Chesterman, supra note 40; Simon Chesterman, Rule of Law, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. (2007), available at http://www.mpepil.com; Maxwell 0.
Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery,7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 106-13 (1999); Maria Vicien-Milburn, Promoting the Rule
of Law Within the United Nations, 43 INT'L LAW. 51 (2009).
44.
See Vicien-Milburn, supra note 43 (examining the contribution of the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal to "key principles that are essential to promoting Rule of Law
within the United Nations"); The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post.Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, 5-6,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Jan. 26, 2004) (highlighting
important issues and observing significant lessons learned "from the Organization's
experiences in the promotion of justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict
societies").

1220

VANDERBIL TIOURNA L OF TRANSNA TIONA L LA W

[VOL. 42:1211

international law is horizontal-developed by and applied to statesjustifications for the rule of law that depend on protecting individuals
against arbitrary or abusive conduct of sovereign or international
institutional authorities do not self-evidently apply.
In such
situations, the rule of law may be justified in functional terms, as
furthering such core values as stability, the peaceful resolution of
disputes, and predictability.
In many areas of horizontal
international law, increased acceptance of the jurisdiction of
independent courts and tribunals-as has occurred under the Law of
the Sea Convention-may be regarded as an advance towards the
45
rule of law ideal.
Precisely which rule of law principles one believes should apply
to the Convention may depend on one's view of the extent to which
the Convention is a self-contained regime. The predominant view
with respect to the regime for the outer limits of the continental shelf
is that the Convention, which created rules and procedures relating
to outer limits, determines the applicable legal order. Yet every
treaty draws, to some extent, on extra-treaty norms (e.g., those
contained in the law of treaties). Should broad extra-Convention
principles such as effective access to forums be identified as legal
norms, they may well be compatible with the Convention. 46 A focus
on such "procedural" norms could lead to a review or critique of the
operations of international institutions in order to help ensure that
47
such principles are implemented.
In general, international rule of law principles should reflect the
core notions of governance of law, supremacy of law, and equal
treatment of members of the same class of subjects of international
law.48 The fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda-the notion that treaties shall be complied with in good
faith 49-is a rule of law concept. With regard to the legal regime

45.
See Chesterman, supra note 43, para. 44 ("Rule of law advances would
include greater acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and other
independent tribunals.").
46.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 293(1) (courts and tribunals may
apply "other rules of international law not incompatible with" the Law of the Sea
Convention), 311. See generally Michael Wood, The InternationalTribunal for the Law
of the Sea and General InternationalLaw, 22 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 351 (2007).
47.
See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of GlobalAdministrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 43-48 (2005)

(describing the different normative bases of global administrative law). If a treaty
regime mandated procedures that conflicted with extra-treaty norms, standard legal
doctrine would regard application of the treaty procedures as proper, at least absent
conflict between the treaty provisions and a peremptory or jus cogens norm. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(articulating the principle that a jus cogens norm of international law will prevail in a
conflict with a treaty provision); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 133-34 (2003) (explaining that when norms conflict with treaty provisions,
generally the treaty provision will prevail).
48.
See Chesterman, supranote 40, at 342.
49.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 47, art. 26.
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governing the outer limits of the continental shelf, respect for the rule
of law certainly includes the idea that coastal states should
consistently follow the Convention's procedural and substantive rules
relating to outer limits. Respect for the rule of law also means that
international organizations charged with applying the law should
follow Convention rules as well as other established rules and
procedures governing institutional behavior.
The idea of "following rules" connotes two principles that this
Article highlights: reliability and accuracy. 50 Reliability means that
previously established standards and processes will be applied and
that the same standards and processes will be applied in the same
way to all similarly situated states and other international actors.
Accuracy requires the use of a standard method of legal
interpretation to articulate the meaning of legal norms. 51 Reliability
and accuracy are distinct concepts: A rule may be applied regularly
and consistently but inaccurately, or a rule may be applied accurately
but irregularly or inconsistently. The broad concept of governance of
laws implies that legal rules will be applied accurately-within a
range of results acceptable to international legal experts-and
reliably. Equality of treatment also implies reliability and
52
consistency.
The third-party dispute settlement system of the Law of the Sea
Convention relates to rule of law questions in several ways. If the
multiple forums available to hear law of the sea disputes were to give
fragmented interpretations of the law, the rule of law value of
consistency would be undermined. However, the risk of inconsistent
legal interpretations should not be overstated, as various courts and
tribunals use standard approaches for interpreting treaties and draw

50.
This Article focuses on the interpretation and application of established
law, rather than on law-making processes. With respect to both law application and
law making, rule of law principles other than reliability and accuracy undoubtedly
exist and often will complement the notions of reliability and accuracy. Such principles
include clarity in written rules, the relative stability of rules, appropriate
transparency, and the need for affected parties to have effective access to available
procedures. These principles may be associated with what Randall Peerenboom,
writing in the context of domestic conceptions of the rule of law, has helpfully described
as a "thin" conception of the rule of law, i.e., one that does not incorporate conceptions
of human rights, particular forms of governance, or aspects of political morality. See
Peerenboom, supra note 39, at 2 ("A thin conception stresses the formal or
instrumental aspects of rule of law-those features that any legal system allegedly
must possess to function effectively as a system of laws").
51.
Although decision makers may disagree about the meaning, or application
to facts, of even highly determinate rules, use of a standard method of treaty
interpretation will limit the range of disagreement; experts will regard some
interpretations as inaccurate.
52.
The author is indebted to Thomas Barton for sharing his thoughts about
the notions of reliability and accuracy as components of the rule of law and how these
concepts may apply internationally. Commentators on the concept of the rule of law in
domestic legal systems have noted related themes. See generally Peerenboom, supra
note 39, at 2-3; Summers, supra note 42, at 1692-94.
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on each other's jurisprudence to promote consistent interpretations of
53
the Convention.
The rule of law also requires that courts and tribunals
themselves-acting as appliers and interpreters of legal rules-54
operate in accordance with specified limits on their authority.
Respect for the rule of law encompasses the idea that an
international court or tribunal should not exceed limits on its own
jurisdiction, as set out in its governing charter-typically a treaty.
When an international court or tribunal acts outside the legal limits
on its authority, observers will not regard its exercise of power as
This legitimacy criterion reflects the importance
legitimate.5 5
attached to adherence to accepted, generally recognized procedures
for exercising legal authority. If a tribunal were to issue a ruling that
upheld a consistent and accurate interpretation of a substantive
treaty provision but did so without proper jurisdiction, its ruling
56
would properly be criticized for not complying with the rule of law.
For this reason, this Article closely examines jurisdictional and
other legal limits on the authority of third-party decision makers. In
particular, Part IV analyzes the provisions of the Law of the Sea

See Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention:
53.
Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 37, 41 (1997)
(noting that "there has been no overt conflict between the decisions of the International
Court on the one hand and of arbitration tribunals on the other" in interpreting
continental shelf legal issues); Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement
and InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 72-73, 77 (1997) (noting that
fears of be great variations between decisions by various international tribunals are for
the most part unfounded); P. Chandrasekhara Rao, The InternationalTribunal for the
Law of the Sea: An Evaluation, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 667, 677
(Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney & Ridiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (noting that the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea "has relied upon or referred to the
decisions by other international courts and tribunals" and that, more generally, "[iut is
to be hoped that each international tribunal or court, though autonomous in itself will
not ignore the decisions of other bodies, thus ensuring the harmonious development of
international law"); Shabtai Rosenne, Establishingthe International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 806, 814 (1995) ("There is no evidence to support the
view that a multiplicity of international judicial institutions for the settlement of
disputes seriously impairs the unity of jurisprudence (a difficult proposition at the best
of times).").
See generally Chesterman, supra note 40, at 342 (noting concerns when
54.
some legal actors, such as U.N. officials and nongovernmental organizations, act
"outside the legal system in question and, almost literally, above the law").
Conceptions of the rule of law related to domestic legal systems reflect
55.
similar concerns. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 42, at 1704 ("Legitimacy requires that
valid law be ... implemented in law-like ways.")
56.
Other rule of law criteria may include the independence and impartiality of
third-party decision makers, appropriate transparency in a tribunal's legal
proceedings, and the effective access of affected parties to the tribunal. See supra note
50. A tribunal's attention to these rule of law principles will also help establish the
"legitimacy" of tribunal decisions. See generally JOSt E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 521-45 (2005) (discussing the factors necessary to call
an international tribunal legitimate); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997)
(identifying the most important characteristics of effective supranational adjudicatory
instruments).
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Convention that may give international courts and tribunals
jurisdiction to hear contentious cases and advisory proceedings
involving the outer limits of the continental shelf. Part IV also
considers what entities, if any, may properly bring claims alleging
that a coastal state has illegally set its outer limits or that the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has improperly
interpreted Convention rules concerning outer limits. First, however,
Part III introduces the Convention rules concerning the outer limits
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines and
the important role of the CLCS.

III. THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND
200 NAUTICAL MILES FROM BASELINES AND
THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

Article 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides rules for
determining the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from baselines. 5 7 It also creates an institution-the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf-to evaluate
state-submitted technical data related to outer limits and to make
recommendations concerning those limits. 58 Part III.A describes the
outer limits of the continental shelf. It also distinguishes setting
outer limits lines from maritime boundary delimitation between
adjacent or opposite states and notes why the location of outer limits
is important. Part III.B then examines the functions of the CLCS.
A. The Outer Limits of the ContinentalShelf
The Law of the Sea Convention defines the continental shelf as
including
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond [a
coastal state's] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its
land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
59
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

Where the outer edge of a coastal state's "continental margin" (a term
encompassing not only the physical shelf but also the physical slope
and rise) extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the state's outer limits
depend on either: (1) a line drawn by reference to points at which the
thickness of sediment is at least one percent of the shortest distance
to the foot of the continental slope; or (2) a line drawn by reference to
60
points no more than sixty nautical miles from the foot of the slope.

57.
58.
59.
60.

See infra note 61.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8), Annex II.
Id. art. 76(1).
Id. art. 76(4).
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Certain additional cut-offs may apply; for example, on submarine
ridges the outer limit may not exceed 350 nautical miles from
baselines.6 1 Annex II of the Final Act of the Third United Nations

61.
Id. art. 76(5)-(6). Article 76, the primary source for determining the outer
limits of the continental shelf, reads in full:
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the limits
provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6.
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land
mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf,
the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic
ridges or the subsoil thereof.
4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the
outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured, by either:
(i)
a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to
the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of
sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance
from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or
(ii)
a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to
fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the
continental slope.
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental
slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the
gradient at its base.
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental
shelf on the seabed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4(a)(i) and (ii), either
shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from
the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the
outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This
paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components
of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.
7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf,
where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not
exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by
coordinates of latitude and longitude.
8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the basis of equitable geographical
representation. The Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States
on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental
shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding.
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criteria for
Conference on the Law of the Sea also sets out specific
62
shelf.
continental
the
of
limits
outer
the
establishing
Knowing where a coastal state's continental shelf outer limits
are located allows coastal states and other international actors to
determine the geographical area in which various international legal
rights and responsibilities apply. Establishing the outer limits of the
continental shelf is not a prerequisite for the exercise of coastal state
rights and responsibilities on the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines; entitlement to the continental shelf is a conceptually
63
distinct issue from setting the outer limits of the continental shelf.
Nevertheless, specifying the outer limits allows for the precise
determination of where various rights and responsibilities may be
exercised. The location of outer limits lines affects the rights of not
only coastal states but also non-coastal states and their nationals. To
pick just one example, non-coastal states or their nationals may want
to engage in marine scientific research; they may have to obtain the
permission of the coastal state if the research is on the continental

shelf.

64

9. The coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently
describing the outer limits of its continental shelf. The Secretary-General shall
give due publicity thereto.
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts.

Id. art. 76. For a detailed analysis of the provisions of Article 76, see generally Comm.
on Legal Issues of the Outer Cont'l Shelf, Int'l Law Ass'n, Second Report, in INT'L LAW
ASS'N,

REPORT

OF

THE

SEVENTY-SECOND

CONFERENCE,

TORONTO

215

(2006)

[hereinafter Second Report] (providing extensive analysis and discussion of the
provisions of Article 76).
Annex II of the Final Act is titled "Statement of Understanding Concerning
62.
a Specific Method to Be Used in Establishing the Outer Edge of the Continental
Margin." LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II; see infra note 87.
A coastal state may have a right to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
63.
miles from baselines, even before the exact location of the outer limit has been
determined. See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 77(3) ("The rights of the coastal
State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on
any express proclamation."); Ted L. McDorman, The Role of the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World, 17 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 301, 305-06 (2002) (noting that coastal states have a right
under both customary international law and the Convention to a continental shelf area
beyond 200 nautical miles where certain physical features are present); Alex G. Oude
Elferink, Article 76 of the LOSC on the Definition of the Continental Shelf: Questions
Concerningits Interpretationfrom a Legal Perspective, 21 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 269, 277-78 (2006) (explaining the fundamental nature of the entitlement to a
continental shelf and grounding this entitlement in "Article 77(3), which provides that
the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or
any express proclamation"); Second Report, supra note 61, at 216-17.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 246. Fewer restrictions apply to marine
64.
scientific research on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines
than inside the 200-mile limit. See id. art. 246(6) (noting that coastal states may refuse
their consent to marine research projects that will occur beyond the 200 nautical mile
limit only in designated areas in which exploitation or exploratory operations are
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The location of the outer limits of the continental shelf also
raises an international community concern.
The Area, which
constitutes the "common heritage" of humankind, 65 begins where the
continental shelf ends; the deep seabed mining regime detailed in the
Law of the Sea Convention and the 1994 Part XI Implementation
Agreement applies in the Area. 66 In sum, determining the outer
limits affects the expectations of a range of international actors in the
areas of navigation, commerce, natural resources, and environmental

rights and responsibilities.
Setting the outer limits of the continental shelf must be
distinguished from maritime boundary delimitations between
opposite or adjacent states. 6 7 Maritime boundary delimitations result
either from international negotiations or from decisions of conciliation
commissions or judicial or arbitral bodies.68
Outer limits
determinations are different. Where parts of the Area exist in a
specific ocean basin, such as in the Arctic Ocean, 6 9 a coastal state
whose continental shelf borders on the Area may establish its own
outer limits after it has submitted supporting data to the CLCS, in
accordance with the requirements of the Convention. 70 The legal
criteria governing maritime boundary delimitations are notoriously
indeterminate, reflecting the fact that a variety of contextual factors
are relevant to the location of the boundary.
In contrast, the

occurring or will occur). For an overview of the rights and duties of coastal states on
the continental shelf, see generally R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA
151-57 (3d ed. 1999).
65.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 136.
66.
Id. arts. 1(1)-(3), 133-85; 1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra
note 1, art. 1 & Annex.
67.
See Second Report, supra note 61, at 237 ("Article 76 is concerned with
entitlement to and the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf and not
the delimitation of overlapping entitlements between neighboring States .... ").
68.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 74, 83, 298(1)(a). See generally 1
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander
eds., 1993); 2 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis
M. Alexander eds., 1993); 3 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I.
Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1998); 4 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES
(Jonathan I. Charney & Robert W. Smith eds., 2002); 5 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
BOUNDARIES (David A. Colson & Robert W. Smith eds., 2005).
69.
See Ron Macnab, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic
Ocean, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS 301, 301-04
(Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Tomas H. Heidar eds., 2004) (discussing
issues related to state claims to continental shelf areas in the Arctic Ocean).
70.
In some situations, the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines of each of two opposite states is unbroken; no portion of the Area lies
beyond the continental shelf of either state. This situation exists, for example, in the
Western Gap of the Gulf of Mexico, where a portion of the continental shelf of Mexico
and the United States lies beyond 200 miles from the baselines of both states. Where
this is the situation, the location of outer limits really becomes a question about the
location of the maritime boundary between two opposite states, to be resolved by
negotiation, conciliation, or a judicial or arbitral proceeding. This Article is concerned
with the situation in which the Area lies beyond the continental shelf.
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Convention criteria defining the outer limits of the continental shelf
71
beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines are highly determinate.
Despite the high degree of determinacy in Article 76 of the
Convention, international lawyers have debated several points about
the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles from
baselines. Coastal states and the CLCS must address significant
scientific uncertainty concerning data relevant to determining outer
limits. 72 In addition, and more importantly for the purposes of this
Article, a degree of legal uncertainty accompanies the interpretation
of Article 76 and other relevant Convention rules and how legal rules
apply to particular circumstances. Article 76 raises several questions
of legal interpretation. For example:
- The terms "oceanic ridge," "submarine ridge," and "submarine elevation" are
not defined in the Law of the Sea Convention, but the terms carry legal
73
significance. An "oceanic ridge" is not part of the continental margin at all,
suggesting that a coastal state cannot rely on an oceanic ridge to extend its
continental shelf beyond 200 miles from baselines. On a "submarine ridge," the
74
maximum outer limit of the continental shelf is 350 miles from baselines.
How should these terms be interpreted?
- When a coastal state has more than one 2500-meter isobath, important for
applying Article 76(5), 7 5 which should be used in the calculation of fixed
76
points?

71.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76. The Law of the Sea Convention
provides much more determinate rules for the outer limits of the continental shelf than
did the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. See Convention on the
Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (setting out
exploitability criterion).
72.
See CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTERFACE
(Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000) (especially the chapters in Part II:
Methodology); Duncan J. McMillan, The Extent of the Continental Shelf- Factors
Affecting the Accuracy of a Continental Margin, 9 MARINE POL'Y 148 (1985).
73.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(3).
74.
Id. art. 76(6). For discussion of the ridges issue, see generally Harald
Brekke & Philip A. Symonds, The Ridge Provisions of Article 76 of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL SHELF
LIMITS, supra note 69, at 169; Ron Macnab, Submarine Elevations and Ridges: Wild
Cards in the Poker Game of UNCLOS Article 76, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 223 (2008);
L.D.M. Nelson, The Continental Shelf: Interplay of Law and Science, in 2 LIBER
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1235, 1245-47; Second Report, supra note 61, at 21922; Robert W. Smith & George Taft, Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf, in
CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 72, at 17. The CLCS has indicated that it will
examine the issue of ridges, which arise from a variety of geological processes, "on a
case-by-case basis," taking into account such factors as "natural prolongation of land
territory and land mass, morphology of ridges and their relation to the continental
margin ... and continuity of ridges." Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS],
Scientific and Technical Guidelines 1 7.2.10-7.2.11, Doc. CLCS/11 (May 13, 1999),
available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CLCS/11 &Lang-E
[hereinafter Scientific and Technical Guidelines]. See also infra note 189 and
accompanying text (suggesting that such terms should be interpreted in light of
changing scientific knowledge).
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(5) (describing the relevance of
75.
isobaths in the calculation of fixed points).
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- How does one connect a "fixed point," important for applying Article 76(4)(7),77 to the 200-mile limit in situations where part of a coastal state's
continental shelf extends only to 200 nautical miles and part of it extends
beyond? Should a fixed point that is outside-but within sixty nautical miles
of-the 200-mile limit be connected to that limit by drawing a line to another
fixed point located on or inside the 200-mile limit that meets the requirements
of Article 76(4)-(5)? Or may the coastal state draw any line up to sixty nautical
miles in length that connects the fixed point outside the 200-mile limit to the
78
coastal state's 200-mile limit?
- Is the primary test for determining the foot of the slope under Article
76(4)(b) 79 "the point of maximum change in gradient" at the base of the slope,
with "evidence to the contrary" being applied only in the absence of credible
information about the point of maximum change? Or may a coastal state rely
at its discretion on either the point of maximum change or on "evidence to the
80
contrary"?
- How should the thickness of sedimentary rocks, referred to in Article
82
81
76(4)(a)(i), be interpreted in cases of complex and irreglar topography?
- Is the CLCS legally entitled to not make outer limits recommendations in all
cases involving land and maritime disputes? The CLCS has taken the position
that it cannot make recommendations in such situations absent the consent of

76.
See Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS], Summary of
Recommendations in Regard to the Submission Made by Australia on 15 November
2004
7 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/
submissions-files/aus04/aussummary-of-recommendations.pdf
[hereinafter
CLCS
Summary of Recommendations for Australia]; Nelson, supra note 74, at 1244-45;
Second Report, supra note 61, at 225-26.
77.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(4)-(7) (describing the determination
of outer limits by reference to fixed points).
78.
See Second Report, supra note 61, at 223-25 (suggesting the question
remains unresolved). The CLCS considered this issue in connection with Australia's
submission. Australia took "the view that it is possible to use lines not more than 60 M
[nautical miles] in length to join fixed points on the formula line beyond 200 M to any
fixed point on the 200 M line." CLCS Summary of Recommendations for Australia,
supranote 76, 8. The Commission, however, took
the view that the determination of the last segment of the outer limits of the
continental shelf shall be established either by the intersection of the formula
line, in accordance with article 76, paragraphs 4 and 7, and the 200 M limit
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, or
it shall be determined by the line of shortest distance between the last fixed
formula point and 200 M limit. In all cases, the segment cannot exceed 60 M in
length in accordance with article 76, paragraph 7.
Id. The Commission's specific recommendations were to the effect that specific
proposed points and their connecting lines "be replaced by points and lines that
conform to the outer edge of the continental margin." Id.
35, 106, 144. The
Commission did not interpret the Convention to give a general answer to the questions
noted in the text. Australia has deferred to the Commission's views.
79.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(4)(b).
80.
See Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 74,
6.1.2 (taking the
position that the general rule is to calculate the foot of the continental slope by finding
the point of maximum change); Nelson, supra note 74, at 1242-43; Second Report,
supra note 61, at 222-23 (describing the flexible definition of "foot of the slope" under
Article 76).
81.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(4)(a)(i).
82.
See Nelson, supra note 74, at 1244.
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all states involved. 8 3
Is this position consistent with Article 76 of the
Convention, which specifies that the provisions governing outer limits
determinations are "without prejudice to the question of delimitations of the
84
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts"?

Certain legal issues relevant to setting the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines require
interpretation of legal concepts outside the confines of Article 76. For
example:
- Are particular straight baselines, which may be important for applying
Article 76(1)-(2) and (4)-(8),85 legal under the test set forth in Article 7 of the
86
Convention?
- Are the criteria in Annex II to the UNCLOS III Final Act (the Statement of
87
Understanding) legally binding, and do they apply only to the Bay of Bengal?

83.
Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS], Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Annex I, Doc. CLCS/40/Rev. 1 (Apr.
17, 2008), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/ 6710125.html [hereinafter Rules
of Procedure].
84.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(10). See id. Annex II, art. 9 ('The
actions of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of
boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts."); Constance Johnson &
Alex G. Oude Elferink, Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf in Cases of Unresolved Land and Maritime Disputes: The Significance of Article
76(10) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS 161, 163-64 (David Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong eds., 2006);
Alex G. Oude Elferink, Submissions of Coastal States to the CLCS in Cases of
Unresolved Land or Maritime Disputes, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF
CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 69, at 263, 264-65, 276 (arguing CLCS rules
on this topic are within the implied competence of the Commission); Second Report,
supra note 61, at 236-37.
85.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(1)-(2), (4)-(8) (referring to the
relationship between baselines and a coastal state's outer limits).
86.
For views on whether the CLCS should take a position with respect to the
legality of baselines, see Letter, United States of America, Notification Regarding the
Submission Made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, Ref. No. CLCS.01.2001.LOSIUSA (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/Deptsllos/clcs_new/submissionsfiles/rusOl/CLCS 01_2001_LOS_
_USAtext.pdf; Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical
Miles: The Relationship Between the CLCS and Third Party Dispute Settlement, in
OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND
RESPONSES 107, 111-12 (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2004);
Comm. on Legal Issues of the Outer Cont'l Shelf, Int'l Law Ass'n, Report, in INT'L LAW
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE, BERLIN 773, 779 n.25 (2004)

[hereinafter FirstReport].
87.
See 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY
FA.A.II.1-.7 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993)
[hereinafter 2 LOS CONVENTION COMMENTARY] (implying that the principles at the
heart of the Bay of Bengal dispute may have import in other regions); Sym6on
Karagiannis, Observations sur la Commission des Limites du Plateau Continental, 8
ESPACES ET RESOURCES MARITIMES 163, 183-84 (1994) (Fr.) (discussing the application
of Annex II of the Convention to the Bay of Bengal); Bernard H. Oxman, The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 211, 228, 230 (1981) (noting that the special method applied in the Bay of
Bengal "because of the peculiar effect of Article 76 on the continental margin in
question" was intended "to reproduce a result in that area equivalent to the effect of
applying Article 76 in the rest of the world"). These criteria may be regarded as an
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Finally, legal questions that go to the threshhold issue of a
coastal state's entitlement vel non to any continental shelf could arise
in the context of a dispute over asserted outer limits. For example:
- Islands are entitled to a continental shelf, but "[r]ocks which cannot sustain
88
Are particular ocean
human habitation or economic life of their own" are not.
elevations, from which a coastal state may claim a continental shelf with outer
89
limits beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, really islands?

"equitable exception" from the substantive requirements of Article 76 in favor of Sri
Lanka. UNCLOS III negotiators were persuaded that features of the Bay of Bengal
made the application of Article 76 criteria particularly unfavorable to Sri Lanka.
However, Kenya, for example, has relied on the Statement of Understanding criteria in
its submission to the CLCS. Republic of Kenya, Submission on the Continental Shelf
2.2, 2.5, 4, delivered to the Commission on the Limits of
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
the Continental Shelf (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/
submissionsfiles/ken35_09/ken2009_executivesummary.pdf. See also India, Partial
Submission on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, at 2, delivered to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissions-files/ind48-09/ind209executive-su
mmary.pdf (requesting the right to provide new submissions at a later date); Union of
Myanmar, Submission on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, at 3,
delivered to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Dec. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissionsfiles/mmr08/mmr-es.
pdf (arguing for an extension of Myanmar's continental shelf boundary); Note Verbale,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, Notification Regarding
Myanmar's Submission on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ref. No. MFA.INT.8.15A/XXXI
(Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/submissionsfiles/mmr08clcsl6_
2008_mmr ken-e.pdf (arguing for an equitable interpretation upon a showing of
special circumstances); Note Verbale, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Notification Regarding Myanmar's Submission on the
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the
(Mar. 2, 2009), available at
Continental Shelf, Ref. No. L[LN/20(xii)
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/submissionsfiles/mmr08/clcsl6_2OO8_mmr lka
e.pdf (arguing for an equitable interpretation specific to Sri Lanka); Note Verbale,
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, Notification Regarding Myanmar's
Submission on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ref. No. NY/RM1443/2/2009 (Mar. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.un.org/Deptslos/clcs-new/submissions_files/mmr08/clcsl6_2008_
inde.pdf (arguing for application of the Statement of Understanding to only Sri Lanka
and India).
LOS Convention, supranote 1, art. 121(3).
88.
China and the Republic of Korea raised this issue in connection with
89.
Japan's submission to the CLCS. Note Verbale, Permanent Mission of the People's
Republic of China to the United Nations, Notification Regarding Japan's Submission
on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf, Ref. No. CML/2/2009 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
Note
http://www.un.orglDeptslos/clcs_new/submissions-files/jpnO8/chn_6febO9_e.pdf;
Verbale, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations,
Notification Regarding Japan's Submission on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200
Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Ref. No.
MUN/046/09 (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/
submissions-files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf. See also The Chairman, Statement by the
Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of
54, delivered to the Commission on the Limits of the
Work in the Commission
Continental Shelf, Doc. CLCS/62 (Apr. 20, 2009) (noting Japan's reaction that the
CLCS's mandate did not encompass this issue). China, the Ivory Coast, and Pakistan
also sought to include the issue of islands/rocks on the agenda of the 2009 Meeting of
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- Are states entitled to a continental shelf off Antarctica?9 0

In sum, states and other international actors may face a range of
legal issues concerning how to interpret and apply rules about the
outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines.
One significant measure of how well outer limits
determinations reflect the rule of law will be how reliably and
accurately the rules concerning these issues are applied to different
states and situations.
B. The Commission on the Limits of the ContinentalShelf
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, a body
established by the Law of the Sea Convention, plays an important
role with respect to establishing the final and binding outer limits of
the continental shelf. The CLCS is a technical body; its twenty-one
members, who reflect an "equitable geographical representation," are
experts in geology, geophysics, or hydrography.9 1 Parties to the
Convention elect the Commission members for five-year terms, but
92
the members serve in their personal capacities.
The CLCS exercises two main functions. One is to consider
information that coastal states are required to submit concerning the

States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. Proposal for the Inclusion of a
Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties: Note
Verbale Dated 21 May 2009 from the PermanentMission of China to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-GeneralJ 3-5, Doc. SPLOS/196 (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter
2009 Chinese Note]; List of Supplementary Items Proposed for Inclusion in the Agenda
of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, Doc. SPLOS/L.60 (May 22, 2009). The
matter was not included in the agenda. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf
[CLCS], June 22-26, 2009, Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties Agenda, Doc.
SPLOS/197 (June 22, 2009) (showing the absence of the islands and rocks issue); Press
Release, Law of Sea Parties Grapple With Decisions on Judges' Selection to Key Treaty
Bodies, Continental Shelf Commission Workload, Budgetary Matters, Doc. SEA/1919
(June 25, 2009) (comments of Japan and Romania) (noting parties' apprehension in
raising the issue). These recent developments highlight the sensitivity of this issue,
suggesting that controversies concerning the status of certain islands or rocks may well
arise in connection with assertions of particular outer limits.
90.
Article 1V(2) of the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 71, which prohibits any "new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica," raises concerns about any effort to set
continental shelf limits off Antarctica. See Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Continental
Shelf of Antarctica:Implications of the Requirement to Make a Submission to the CLCS
under Article 76 of the LOS Convention, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 485 (2002).
The issue is moot at present, given states' willingness not to have the CLCS take action
with respect to information about continental shelf limits appurtenant to Antarctica.
See CLCS Summary of Recommendations for Australia, supra note 76,
3 (listing
broad support for Australia's recommendation not to define Antarctic continental shelf
outer limits); Note from the Permanent Mission of Australia to the Secretary-Generalof
the United Nations Accompanying the Lodgement of Australia's Submission, Note No.
89/2004 (Nov. 2004), http://www.un.org/Deptsflos/clcsnew/submissionsjfiles/aus04/
Documents/aus doc es-attachment.pdf (urging the Commission not to proceed with
respect to the continental shelf off Antarctica).
91.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8), Annex II, art. 2(1).
92.
Id. Annex II, arts. 2(1), 2(4).
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outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines and make recommendations related to those limits. 93 Each
coastal state sets its own continental shelf outer limits lines, but
limits established "on the basis of' CLCS recommendations "shall be
final and binding."94 The CLCS does not set or certify outer limits; it
can help
fills a procedural role, issuing recommendations that
95
legitimate the outer limits that coastal states establish.
The CLCS also serves a second function: to provide technical and
scientific advice when requested by a coastal state in order to help
that state prepare for its submission. 96 The CLCS has 97organized
training programs to advise states about their submissions.
Article 3(1)(a) of Annex II of the Law of the Sea Convention
provides a link between CLCS work and legal standards. When the
CLCS makes recommendations, it must do so "in accordance with
article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August
1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea."9 8s Although the CLCS is a technical body, this language
suggests a connection between its work and international law. CLCS
members may well not interpret and apply the Convention in
accordance with the law of treaties, as would a government legal
officer or an international court or tribunal. Perhaps the language
quoted above simply emphasizes that the CLCS cannot substitute its
own scientific concepts related to the deep seabed or the continental
shelf for the ones used in the Convention. Still, when the CLCS
determines the scope of its competence or addresses some of the legal
issues noted in Part III.A, it at least implicitly takes legal positions,
which observers will evaluate in terms of their conformity to the law.
In the words of Judge Dolliver Nelson, "one of the cardinal functions
of the Commission must necessarily be to interpret or apply the
relevant provisions of the Convention-an essentially legal task."99

93.
Id. art. 76(8), Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
94.
Id. art. 76(8), Annex II, art. 7.
95.
See McDorman, supra note 63, at 319-20 (stating that the Commission
plays the role of "legitimator").
96.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3(1)(b).
A voluntary trust fund also provides some resources to assist developing
97.
states in preparing their submissions. See G.A. Res. 58/240, Annex, U.N. Doc.
AJRES/58/240 (Dec. 23, 2003); G.A. Res. 55/7, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/7 (Oct. 30,
2000).
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3(1)(a). For the text of Article
98.
76, see supra note 61, and for discussion about the Statement of Understanding, see
supra note 87.
Nelson, supra note 74, at 1238. See L.D.M. Nelson, The Role of the
99.
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in the Interpretation and
Application of the Convention, in CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 255, 256-57 (Myron H. Nordquist

& John Norton Moore eds., 2001) ("An important function of the Commission that is
not expressly referred to in the Convention has to do with the interpretation or
application of the Convention."). But see Oude Elferink, supra note 86, at 109 (arguing
that the fact that the twenty-one members of the Commission are "required to be
experts in the fields of geology, geophysics or hydrography" indicates that the CLCS
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Some may question whether the CLCS, as a technical body,
should be evaluated according to rule of law criteria, but it is
essential that the CLCS follow regular procedures and make its
The CLCS
recommendations in accordance with Article 76.100
promotes reliability through its Rules of Procedure and its Scientific
and Technical Guidelines, 0 1 the adoption of which falls within the
body's inherent powers.' 0 2 The CLCS obtains legal assistance from
several sources. For procedural support, it relies on the Division for
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations Office of
Legal Affairs. 10 3 For other legal questions, the CLCS may rely on
state submissions, discussions at Meetings of States Parties to the
Convention, or occasional advice from the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations. 0 4 The fact that no lawyers are represented on the
05
Commission has, however, occasioned critical comments.'
The International Law Association's Committee on the Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf has taken the position that "[tjhe
CLCS should accept a reasonable interpretation of relevant
provisions of the Convention provided by a coastal State making a
submission."'10 6 If this position were taken too literally, CLCS
recommendations could become inconsistent should different states

engages in a "process involving scientific and technical questions" rather than
consideration of legal issues).
100.
The debate relates to a point raised in Part I1.B of this Article: whether
rule of law considerations apply to the CLCS. Many would agree that the Commission
should follow rules and procedures set out in the Convention. Even though the CLCS
does not issue any binding rulings, it may fall within the category of a "global
administrative body," and hence, according to some, should "meet adequate standards
of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality." Kingsbury, Krisch &
Stewart, supra note 47, at 17.
101.
See Rules of Procedure, supra note 83; Scientific and Technical Guidelines,
supra note 74.
102.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 228.
103.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex 11, art. 2(5).
104.
See, e.g., Legal Opinion on Whether It Is Permissible, Under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission, for a Coastal State, Which Has Made a Submission to the Commission in
Accordance with Article 76 of the Convention, to Provide to the Commission in the
Course of the Examination by It of the Submission, Additional Material and
Information Relating to the Limits of Its Continental Shelf or SubstantialPart Thereof,
Which Constitute a Significant Departurefrom the OriginalLimits and Formulae Lines
That Were Given Due Publicity by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in
Accordance with Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, Doc. CLCS/46
(Sept. 7, 2005); Legal Opinion as to the Most AppropriateProcedure in Cases Where It
Might Be Necessary to Institute Proceedings Following an Alleged Breach of
Confidentiality, Doc. CLCS/14 (May 18, 1999); Legal Opinion on the Applicability of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the Members of
the Commission, Doc. CLCS/5 (Mar. 11, 1998). See Oude Elferink, supra note 86, at
112.
See, e.g., 1 E.D. BROWN, SEA-BED ENERGY AND MINERALS: THE
105.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 31 (1992).
106.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 228. See also McDorman, supra note 63, at
309 (arguing that in light of the "political reality of boundary-making," any ambiguity
in Article 76(8) should be interpreted with a view to minimal interference with the
"political prerogatives of coastal state boundary-making").

1234

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42.1211

offer different but "reasonably accurate" interpretations of the
Convention. 10 7 To the extent that states will choose the same
interpretation because it maximizes the area of the continental shelf
that the CLCS includes in its recommendation, the risk of
inconsistent interpretations is minimized.
Although submissions began slowly, the CLCS now faces a heavy
workload. The CLCS received its first submission from Russia in
2001, followed by Brazil and Australia in 2004, and Ireland in
In the last few years, submissions have increased
2005.108
An extended ten-year period for submissions and
dramatically.
preliminary information filings expired on May 12, 2009.109 As of
July 1, 2009, the CLCS had received fifty-one submissions or partial
submissions'1 0 and forty-three preliminary information filings,"'

If the Convention effectively incorporates a meta-rule to the effect that
107.
states may choose from among any reasonably accurate interpretation of Convention
provisions concerning outer limits, then it would be consistent to "accept any
reasonable interpretation ... provided by a coastal State." Second Report, supra note
61, at 228.
Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the
108.
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8,
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (Aug. 20,
[hereinafter
2009), http:/www.un.org/Deptsflos/clcs-new/commission-submissions.htm
Submissions].
According to Annex II, Article 4 of the Law of the Sea Convention, each
109.
state intending to establish limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines must submit proposed limits and supporting data to the CLCS no later
than ten years after the Convention enters into force for that state. LOS Convention,
supra note 1, Annex II, art. 4. For states that had accepted the Convention before it
entered into force in 1994, this ten-year period expired on November 16, 2004. See id.
However, in 2001 the States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention decided to
extend this ten-year period to May 12, 2009. Decision Regarding the Date of
Commencement of the Ten-Year Period for Making Submissions to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf Set Out in Article 4 of Annex If to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (a), Doc. SPLOS/72 (May 29, 2001). (May
13, 1999-the start of the revised ten-year period-was the date on which the CLCS
adopted its Scientific and Technical Guidelines.) In June 2008, the States Parties to the
Convention, noting the Commission's heavy workload and challenges faced by
developing states, decided that a state could satisfy the extended time period by filing
preliminary information indicating the outer limits of the continental shelf, describing
the status of preparation of the planned submission, and noting when the state
intended to make its submission to the CLCS. Decision Regarding the Workload of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Ability of States,
ParticularlyDeveloping States, to Fulfill the Requirements of Article 4 of Annex II to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as the Decision Containedin
SPLOS/72, Paragraph(a), l(a), Doc. SPLOS/183 (June 20, 2008).
110.
See Submissions, supra note 108.
See Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the
111.
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/clcsnewcommission-preliminary.htm; Issues Related to the Workload of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf-Submissions to the Commission
8, Doc. SPLOS[INF/22 (May 22, 2009).
and Receipt of Preliminary Information
Although Annex II, Article 4 refers to a "coastal State" rather than a "State Party"
making submissions to the CLCS, it is doubtful that a nonparty to the Law of the Sea
Convention could make a submission to the CLCS, seeking to obtain a recommendation
that the nonparty could then rely on to set generally recognized, final and binding
continental shelf outer limits. See Tullio Treves, Remarks on Submissions to the
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and had adopted recommendations with respect to eight
112
submissions.
Should a coastal state disagree with the recommendations of the
CLCS, that state "shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or
new submission to the Commission."'1 13 Russia's 2001 submission
concerning the continental shelf under the Arctic Ocean, for example,
resulted in the CLCS recommendation that Russia make certain
115
revisions. 114 A revised Russian submission is expected.
Approximately three-fourths of the cases in which the legal
continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines
involve situations requiring maritime boundary delimitations
between adjacent or opposite states.' 16 The actions of the CLCS
"shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. '117 The CLCS has
decided that it will not consider submissions implicating a land or
maritime dispute unless all states party to such a dispute consent. 118
The CLCS may issue recommendations if all states concerned with
such a dispute jointly make a submission; of the fifty-one submissions
the CLCS had received as of July 1, 2009, five were joint
submissions. 1 9 In cases of joint submissions, states with disputed

Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Response to Judge Marotta's
Report, 21 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 363-64 (2006); Riidiger Wolfrum,
President, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Statement at the 73rd Annual
Biennial Conference of the International Law Association, The Outer Continental
Shelf: Some Considerations Concerning Applications and the Potential Role of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 6 (Aug. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
But see Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Dispute
Settlement among Non-Parties to the LOS Convention with Respect to the Outer Limits
of the Continental Shelf, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 495, 497-99
(Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. ed., 1983) (asserting that the Convention "would permit nonparties to have access to the Commission"). To date, only States Parties to the
Convention have made submissions. See Submissions, supra note 108. The Meeting of
States Parties determined to seek an opinion of the Legal Counsel of the United
Nations on this matter only if the need arises. See The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea T 67, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/53/456 (Oct. 5, 1998).
112.
See Recommendations Issued by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (May 22, 2009), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/commissionrecommendations.htm.
113.
LOS Convention, supranote 1, Annex II, art. 8.
114.
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Oceans and
the Law of the Sea
38-41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002). "The summary of the recommendations [concerning the
Russian submission] does not shed any light on the question of whether the
recommendations addressed the interpretation of provisions of the Convention." Oude
Elferink, supranote 86, at 114.
115.
Erik Molenaar et al., Introduction to the Background Papers 10 (Sept. 8,
2008), http://arctic-transform.orgldownload/Intro.pdf.
116.
See, e.g., Submissions, supra note 108.
117.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 9. See also id. art. 76(10)
(referring to the CLCS definition of the continental shelf).
118.
Rules of Procedure,supra note 83, Annex I, 5(a).
119.
See Submissions, supra note 108 (listing joint submissions by (i) the
Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of the Seychelles, (ii) Malaysia and Vietnam,
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boundaries could settle the delimitations at a later date.
Alternatively, a state may make a partial submission, holding off on
submitting data concerning an area in which maritime boundaries
1 20
are disputed.
The Law of the Sea Convention makes the CLCS process
centrally important to states' determinations of the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines. The
workload of the CLCS suggests that it will have ample opportunity to
consider the scope of its competence and make recommendations "in
accordance with article 76" of the Convention. 1 21 When the CLCS
effectively interprets or applies Article 76, observers of the CLCS's
operations will consider the reliability and accuracy of its positions.
They may also evaluate whether the Commission acts with sufficient
122
transparency and in accordance with other rule of law values.
The CLCS process does not formally displace the third-party
dispute settlement system of the Convention, 12 3 Part IV analyzes
when third-party procedures may be used to review CLCS
recommendations or to rule on legal questions related to a coastal
state's outer limits.

(iii) South Africa and France, (iv) Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea
and Solomon Islands, and (v) France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland).
120.
Donald R. Rothwell, Issues and Strategies for Outer Continental Shelf
Claims, 23 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 185, 202-09 (2008); see, e.g., Comm'n on the
Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS], Summary of the Recommendations of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in regard to the Joint Submission
Made by France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland in Respect of the Area of the Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay on 19
May 2006, 2 (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.un.org/Deptslos/clcs-new/submissions-files/
frgbires06/fisu-clcs recommendations-summary2009.pdf; Johnson & Oude Elferink,
supranote 84, at 179.
121.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
122.
For discussion of transparency in the CLCS, see, for example, Alex G. Oude
Elferink, "Openness"and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Process Does
Not Need to Be Adjusted, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 36 (2009); Ron Macnab, The Case
for Transparency in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf in Accordance with
UNCLOS Article 76, 35 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1 (2004); Treves, supra note 111, at 367.
For discussion of the independence and impartiality of CLCS members, see, for
example, McDorman, supra note 63, at 311-12; Nelson, supra note 74, at 1238-39. The
question of effective access to the CLCS, particularly by developing states, relates to
the decision to extend the time period for filing submissions and to concerns about the
sufficiency of financial and technical assistance available to those states. See supra
note 109. For a discussion of rule of law criteria related to these concerns, see supra
note 50.
123.
Nelson, supra note 74, at 1239.

20091

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND CONTINENTAL SHELF OUTER LIMITS

IV.

1237

THIRD-PARTY PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE OUTER
LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200
NAUTICAL MILES FROM BASELINES

The dispute settlement provisions of the Law of the Sea
Convention allow some third-party proceedings concerning the outer
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines.
Part IV.A analyzes the availability of compulsory
international third-party dispute settlement in contentious outer
limits cases involving substantive and procedural provisions of the
Convention, and Part IV.B notes the possibility of contentious cases
brought pursuant to special agreements. Finally, Part IV.C explores
the possibility of advisory proceedings.
Some jurisdictional and standing requirements could block the
pursuit of cases. However, even if these requirements are satisfied,
other concerns remain. These concerns-which go to according
proper deference to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf and the ability of courts and tribunals to learn and assess
relevant scientific data-suggest that few cases may be pursued and
few judgments rendered in which the detailed requirements of Article
76 are interpreted and applied.
A. Contentious Cases Pursuant to Compulsory Procedures
The focus now shifts to the availability of international courts or
tribunals to hear disputes over the outer limits of the continental
shelf under the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions concerning
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions-provisions found
in Part XI, in Section 2 of Part XV, and in Annexes of the Convention.
Certain interstate cases involving such disputes are available
pursuant to the Convention's provisions. However, before analyzing
those cases, this Article first notes categories of actors-private
parties, the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and the CLCSthat cannot pursue contentious outer limits cases, at least absent
(and in some cases even with) an agreement between the actor and a
124
coastal state.
1.

Non-amenability of Certain Entities to Compulsory Procedures

First, private parties may not challenge a coastal state's outer
limits before an international court or tribunal under any basis for
compulsory third-party jurisdiction provided in the Convention. 125
Indeed, it would have been astounding if the negotiators at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea had agreed to allow

124.
See also infra Part IV.B-C.
125.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 291(2) ("The dispute settlement
procedures specified in this Part shall be open to entities other than States Parties only
as specifically provided for in the Convention.").
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private parties to challenge, in an international court, any
recommendation or action concerning coastal state "territorial"
limits-a matter going to the core of sovereign prerogatives. Under
the Convention itself, individuals may only participate in third-party
proceedings in certain cases involving mineral exploration and
126
exploitation in the Area.
Second, the CLCS cannot participate in cases under the
compulsory jurisdiction provisions of the Convention. 12 7 Possible
relationships between the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention and the CLCS were discussed at UNCLOS III, but they
were not pursued. 128 According to Article 291(2), the CLCS lacks
access to the Convention's dispute settlement forums because the
Convention does not "specifically provide" such access for the
CLCS. 12 9 Thus, no court or tribunal could hear a claim that the
CLCS brought against a coastal state pursuant to the Convention's
provisions for compulsory procedures. 130
For example, the
Commission could not claim in a third-party forum that a coastal
state had set its outer limits without submitting sufficient data to the

126.
Private parties may appear before the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in some cases involving deep
seabed mining contracts in the Area. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 187, Annex
VI, art. 37 (providing for jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber in several
categories of cases involving natural or juridical persons, but only "with respect to
activities in the Area"). The Statute of the ITLOS also recognizes that disputes may be
submitted pursuant to "agreements," a term that may encompass agreements to which
natural and juridical persons are party. See id. Annex. VI, arts. 20(2), 21 (describing
access to and jurisdiction of the Tribunal); infra note 241. But see GARCiA, supra note 8,
at 550 (arguing that such agreements must be treaties, thus precluding jurisdiction
over natural and juridical persons). If a private party were to be prosecuted in
municipal court for violating a coastal state's continental shelf regulations, and the
private party defended by arguing that those limits were illegal, then that court might
rule on the legality under international law of the coastal state's outer limits.
127.
First Report, supra note 86, at 784 ("There is no explicit reference to the
CLCS in any provision of the Convention addressing the access to these mechanisms.").
See also LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3 (defining the role of the CLCS).
128.
See 2 LOS CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 87, A.II.2 ("[tlhe scope
of the powers of the Commission ... and of the relationship with the proposed dispute
settlement procedures under the new Convention, remain to be discussed"); First
Report, supra note 86, at 784 n.49 ("The travaux priparatoiresof article 76 do not
indicate that the relationship between the CLCS procedure and dispute settlement
mechanisms was addressed in any detail at UNCLOS III."); Nelson, supra note 74, at
1239 ("Questions regarding . . . the relationship between the Commission with 'the
proposed dispute settlement procedures under the new Convention' were raised in the
Evensen Group but the matter never seems to have gone further.").
129.
See L.D.M. Nelson, Claims to the Continental Shelf Beyond the 200-mile
Limit, in LIBER AMICORUM GONTHER JAENICKE -

ZUM 85. GEBURTSTAG 573, 579

(Volkmar G6tz, Peter Selmer & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 1998) ("It is certain however
that the Commission has not been granted the power to submit any dispute concerning
the outer limit of a coastal State's continental shelf to any court or tribunal."); Oude
Elferink, supra note 86, at 116 ("The compulsory dispute settlement of the LOS
Convention are open to States Parties to the Convention. These procedures are only
open to other entities as specifically provided for in the Convention. No provision is
made for the CLCS in this respect.").
130.
Vicente Marotta Rangel, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Delimitation
of the Outer Continental Shelf, 21 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 347, 361-62 (2006).
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Commission.
Furthermore, a coastal state could not judicially
challenge the CLCS, alleging that CLCS recommendations, on which
a coastal state's outer limits are to be based in order to become "final
and binding" under Article 76(8), do not comport with the law
131
concerning outer limits.
Third, the Convention does not authorize the International
Seabed Authority to challenge the legality of a coastal state's outer
limits in a contentious compulsory jurisdiction case. 132 It might have
been sensible to provide for this possibility, since an extensive
continental shelf reduces the geographical extent of the Area (as
previously noted, the "common heritage" of humankind 133) and
correspondingly reduces the scope of the ISA's activities. 134 With
such a provision, the ISA could have raised international community
concerns about the impact of impermissible outer limits on the Area
and the regime for deep seabed mining under Part XI and the 1994
Implementation Agreement.13 5
According to the Convention,
however, the ISA lacks access to the third-party forums specified in
Part XV of the Convention in compulsory jurisdiction cases. 136
The analysis under Part XI is more complex, since the ISA may
participate in limited categories of contentious cases. May the
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS hear, pursuant to Article
187(b)(i) of the Convention, a case brought by the ISA against a
coastal state, alleging a violation of Part XI-perhaps Article 137because the coastal state had set overly broad outer limits and
undertaken exploration or exploitation activities in a portion of what

131.
A coastal state that disagrees with a CLCS recommendation is to make a
new or revised submission to the Commission. LOS Convention, supra note 1, art.
76(8); supra note 113 and accompanying text.
132.
Nor may the ISA intervene in interstate cases. See LOS Convention, supra
note 1, Annex VI, art. 31.
133.
Id. art. 136.
134.
See id. art. 1 (defining a seabed as an area beyond the limits of coastal state
jurisdiction).
135.
See, e.g., MAHMOUDI, supra note 25, at 77. In 1970 the United States
proposed allowing an International Seabed Boundary Review Commission to institute
proceedings before the Tribunal of an International Seabed Resources Authority
concerning unresolved differences over coastal state outer limits. U.N. Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed & the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of Nat'l Jurisdiction,
Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area art. 45, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/25 (1970), 9 I.L.M. 1046, 1060 (Aug. 3, 1970) (prepared by the United States)
(submitted to the U.N. General Assembly's Seabed Committee before UNCLOS III
convened). See Nelson, supra note 74, at 1239 n.12. The issue of community interest in
the outer limits of the continental shelf was raised anew in 2009 at the nineteenth
Meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. See 2009 Chinese Note,
supra note 89,
1-2.
136.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 291; Caflisch, supra note 8, at 324
("Access to these procedures is limited to States ... and the question which arises is
whether and in what forum the Authority could challenge a continental shelf claim.");
Rangel, supra note 130, at 360, 362 ("The Authority has no locus standi before the
settlement disputes rules under LOSC, Part XV.").
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the ISA considered to be the Area?13 7 Although this possibility has
been suggested, 38 significant obstacles exist to such a case. Article
187 restricts the Chamber's jurisdiction in contentious cases to
disputes involving so-called "activities in the Area"-a term of art
that does not encompass disputes over outer limits.' 3 9 In addition,
Article 134, which addresses the scope of Part XI, specifically
provides that "[n]othing in this article affects the establishment of the
outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Part VI," and
a binding decision issued by the Chamber would conflict with the
Convention's provisions for coastal state establishment of outer
limits. 140 As Judge Dolliver Nelson has observed,
the dispute which gives rise to such a cause of action concerns
essentially the boundary between a coastal State's outer continental
shelf and the international seabed area-a boundary which depends
solely on the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf.
This is a matter to be dealt with not by the Authority .... 141

In short, the Seabed Disputes Chamber exercises limited jurisdiction
that does not extend to contentious cases relating to outer limits.
Finally, even apart from the Convention's formal limitations
with respect to ISA involvement in contentious cases, it is politically
unlikely that the states that comprise the ISA would authorize a
challenge to a coastal state's outer limits. The ISA Council would
have to approve any such authorization by consensus or
supermajority vote, and no decision can be approved in the Council if
a majority of the members of any one of the Council's four chambers
142
has objected to it.

137.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 187(b)(1). Article 137 describes the
legal status of the Area and its resources.
138.
F.H. Paolillo, The Institutional Arrangements for the InternationalSeabed
and their Impact on the Evolution of InternationalOrganizations,188 HAGUE RECUEIL
DES COURS 139, 191 (1984) (cited in Nelson, supra note 129, at 576). See 2 E.D. BROWN,
SEA-BED ENERGY AND MINERALS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 374 (2001) ("The
argument would be that State A, by extending the limits of its continental shelf to
include a part of the sea-bed considered by the Authority to form part of the Area, had
acted in violation of Part XI."); Boyle, supra note 53, at 46 n.23 (arguing that the ISA
may have authority to bring proceedings under Article 187(b)(1)); Yozo Yokota, The
Boundary Between Deep Seabed and Continental Shelf, in THE FRONTIER OF THE SEAS:
THE PROBLEMS OF DELIMITATION 36-37 (Ocean Ass'n of Japan ed., 1981) (suggesting
how the ISA might bring judicial proceedings challenging coastal state outer limits
under the LOS Convention).
139.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
140.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 134(4).
141.
Nelson, supra note 129, at 576-77. Accord, e.g., FirstReport, supra note 86,
at 785; Caflisch, supra note 8, at 324-25; Karagiannis, supra note 87, at 192. For
discussion of advisory opinions by the Seabed Disputes Chamber, see infra notes 22336 and accompanying text.
142.
It seems likely that the Council, rather than the ISA Assembly, would have
to authorize the institution of any judicial proceeding. Article 162(2)(u) explicitly
grants the Council a related power with respect to judicial proceedings explicitly
mentioned in the Convention, suggesting that it would be the appropriate organ to deal
with the institution of any proposed contentious case related to outer limits. See LOS
Convention, supra note 1, art. 160(2)(n) (Assembly shall decide "which organ of the
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Interstate Cases

Interstate cases related to disputes over the outer limits of the
continental shelf fall within the Convention's Part XV provisions
143
governing compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions.
Disputes concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond
200 miles from baselines are not among the categories of disputes
that the Convention makes subject to limitations or optional
Statements by some observers that the dispute
exceptions. 144
settlement provisions of the Convention do not apply to outer limits
disputes 145 perhaps implicitly reflect the view that outer limitspolitical boundaries-are a matter of high sensitivity that should not
be subject to legal review by courts or tribunals, or, more narrowly,
rely on an overly restrictive interpretation of the Convention
provision that outer limits set "on the basis of' CLCS
recommendations "shall be final and binding. ' 14 6 However, a state
might not set its outer limits "on the basis of' a CLCS
recommendation, a point that will be addressed further below. 147 In
general, according to the International Law Association's Committee
on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, "[i]f the outer limits of
the continental shelf have not been established in accordance with
the substantive and procedural requirements of article 76," that
"issue may be raised by other States Parties under Part XV of the
148

Convention."'

Authority shall deal with any . . . matter [within the Authority's competence] not
specifically entrusted to a particular organ, consistent with the distribution of powers
and functions among the organs of the Authority."). A supermajority vote is required on
matters of substance, and a decision to authorize a judicial proceeding would likely be
deemed substantive, since it does not concern internal procedures of ISA organs. See
1994 Part XI Implementation Agreement, supra note 1, Annex, § 3(2)-(3), (5).
Furthermore, any decision to pursue litigation would have financial implications for
the Authority, thus requiring a recommendation of the Finance Committee, which
must proceed by consensus. See id. Annex, §§ 3(7), 9(8).
A Part XI interstate contentious case brought to the Seabed Disputes
143.
Chamber under Article 187(a) of the Convention (or to a special chamber under Article
188(1)(a)) would have to relate to "activities in the Area," a restriction that would
preclude legal challenges concerning outer limits. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 231 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
144.
145.
U.N. DIv. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE
87, U.N. Sales No. E.93.V.16 (1983);
SEA: DEFINITION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

Smith & Taft, supra note 74, at 20. See also Karagiannis, supra note 87, at 189
(expressing skepticism about the availability of third-party dispute settlement, linked
to concerns about actio popularis, discussed infra notes 182-84 and accompanying
text).
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8). For discussion of the meaning of
146.
"final and binding," see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
147.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8).
148.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 233. Most commentators agree. See, e.g.,
DAVID ANDERSON, MODERN LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS 391 (2008); 1 BROWN,

supra note 105, at 31-32; Caflisch, supra note 8, at 324, 341 n.53; Gudmundur
Eiriksson, The Case of Disagreement Between a Coastal State and the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF THE
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The following comments focus on potential interstate cases in
which a coastal state has set its outer limits line-cases in which a
dispute over outer limits may be ripe or "live"-and those outer limits
border on the Area. 149 Any such case will fall into one of four
categories, namely those in which the coastal state has: (a) set its
outer limits before submitting data to the CLCS; (b) set its outer
limits after submitting data but before the CLCS has made its
recommendation;
(c) set its outer limits after a CLCS
recommendation, but has allegedly not set those limits "on the basis
of' that CLCS recommendation; and (d) set its outer limits "on the
150
basis of' a CLCS recommendation.
In all of these categories of cases, a central issue would likely be
whether a coastal state's outer limits comply with substantive
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. In Category (a) cases,
the complaining state could also challenge the coastal state's failure
to comply with procedural provisions. Article 76(8) requires that
"[i]information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles" from baselines "shall be submitted by the coastal
'15 1
State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf."
Thus, a coastal state's failure to submit data could provide the basis
for a legal challenge. 152 A court or tribunal could find that failing to
follow this Convention procedure violates the Convention and
conclude that the coastal state should make a submission to the
CLCS. To date, coastal states have, in practice, overwhelmingly
indicated their willingness to submit data to the CLCS, so Category
153
(a) cases may be most unlikely.
In a Category (b) case, a coastal state has submitted data to the
CLCS, but the Commission has not yet issued a recommendation.
The CLCS process envisions a coastal state: (1) submitting data to the
CLCS; (2) waiting for its recommendations; (3) in the event of a
disagreement with the CLCS, making a revised or new submission to
the CLCS; and (4) eventually setting outer limits "on the basis of' a
CLCS recommendation and in conformity with Article 76.154
Although coastal states setting their outer limits "on the basis of'
CLCS recommendations have the advantage that such limits "shall
be final and binding,"'155 delays in CLCS consideration of submissions

CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 69, at 251, 258; McDorman, supra note 63, at 317-19;
Oude Elferink, supranote 86, at 115; Wolfrum, supra note 111, at 9-11.
149.
See supra note 70.
150.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8).
151.
Id. See also id. Annex II, art. 4 ("Where a state intends to establish.., the
outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit
particulars of such limits to the Commission.").
152.
McDorman, supranote 63, at 320.
153.
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
154.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8).
155.
Id. The Convention stops short of literally specifying that a coastal state
must act "on the basis of' a CLCS recommendation when setting its outer limits.
MAHMOUDI, supra note 25, at 77. See also Second Report, supra note 61, at 232
(arguing that, under the Convention, states cannot establish their outer limits on the
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might tempt some states to proclaim outer limits lines before
receiving a CLCS recommendation. 1 56 Analytically, cases in this
category appear similar to Category (c) cases-cases in which a
coastal state has set its outer limits following receipt of a CLCS
recommendation but has allegedly not set those limits "on the basis
of' that recommendation. Category (b) cases differ from Category (c)
cases simply because in a Category (b) case the CLCS has issued no
recommendation, and the coastal state would thus never have
grounds to argue that its outer limits were established on the basis of
a CLCS recommendation.
In Category (c) cases, a court or tribunal would have to construe
the meaning of the phrase "on the basis of' under Article 76. The
situations in which these cases would arise may be rare. The CLCS
process envisions an eventual accommodation between the coastal
state and the CLCS, with the coastal state adapting its submission in
light of the views of the CLCS. 157 In line with this process, CLCS
recommendations will be based on the submission as adapted, and
the coastal state should not vary from the recommendations when it
establishes its outer limits. 158 An actual Category (c) case may
suggest that this process has broken down or perhaps that political
considerations in the coastal state have led it to depart from the
CLCS recommendation.
(Note, however, that if a CLCS
recommendation were to indicate specific outer limits, the phrase "on
the basis of' does not suggest that the coastal state necessarily must
follow every detail of the recommendation. 1 59) One can hypothesize

basis of any information not considered by the CLCS). Annex II, Article 7 of the
Convention provides that "[c]oastal States shall establish the outer limits of the
continental shelf in conformity with the provisions of Article 76, paragraph 8." LOS
Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 7. Article 76(8) of the Convention in turn
requires coastal states to submit data to the Commission, provides that "[t]he
Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States," and provides that "[t]he
limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations
shall be final and binding." Id. art. 76(8). Annex II, Article 8 addresses the requirement
that the coastal state make a new or revised submission to the Commission in case it
disagrees with the Commission's recommendations. Id. Annex II, art. 8. Although
Article 76(8) and Annex II, Articles 7 and 8, when read literally, only obligate coastal
states to make submissions to the CLCS, some may infer from these provisions that a
coastal state must, in setting its outer limits, act "on the basis of' CLCS
recommendations.
156.
In addition, states that have made only partial submissions might assert a
complete outer limits line. See Oude Elferink, supra note 84, at 274.
157.
See supra note 155.
158.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8). ("The limits of the shelf
established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and
binding.").
159.
During the Ninth Session of UNCLOS III, the words "on the basis of'
replaced "taking account of' in drafts of what became Article 76(8). The latter
formulation would have left coastal states with more discretion to reject CLCS
recommendations. Other UNCLOS III proposals, however, would have created a
stronger link between a coastal state's outer limits determination and the CLCS's
recommendation. For example, some proposals would have required that outer limits
be "in accordance with" CLCS recommendations. Other proposals would have required
a Continental Shelf Boundary Commission to "certify" or "make decisions" concerning
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cases in which a coastal state quite clearly does not act on the basis of
a recommendation. A coastal state that establishes its outer limits
when the Commission actually recommends that the coastal state
submit additional data relevant to those limits could hardly be acting
on the basis of a CLCS recommendation. 160 Similarly, a coastal state
that claims as part of its continental shelf a formation that the CLCS
recommendation describes as an oceanic ridge would not be acting on
the basis of that recommendation. 16 1 In a Category (c) case, however,
it is debatable whether a claimant state would prevail merely by
showing that the coastal state had established an outer limit other
than on the basis of a CLCS recommendation. For a claimant state to
establish that an outer limit was not opposable to it, the claimant
state should have to show that the outer limit violated the
substantive provisions of the Convention.
Indeed, the core issue in any interstate case involving outer
limits of the continental shelf is likely to be whether a coastal state's
declared outer limits differ from the substantive requirements of the
Law of the Sea Convention. This certainly would be true in any
Category (d) case, in which the coastal state has established its outer
limits "on the basis of' a CLCS recommendation. Since Article 76(8)
specifically provides that limits set "on the basis of [CLCS]
recommendations shall be final and binding," a court or tribunal in a
Category (d) case would have to construe the meaning of "shall be
final and binding." The phrase does not mean that limits set on the
basis of CLCS recommendations are shielded from judicial review.
Rather, the better conclusion is that outer limits
established in accordance with the substantive and procedural
requirements of article 76 . . . will be final and binding on the coastal
State concerned and other States Parties to the Convention. Outer
limits lines that have not been established in accordance with these
162
requirements will not become binding on other States.

Outer limits lines "shall be" final and thus unalterable by the coastal
state, once it files required information with the Secretary-General of

coastal states' outer limits. See 2 LOS CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 87,
76.12-.15, 76.17, A.II.3, A.II.8 (describing alternate proposals concerning the role of the
CLCS in states' outer limits determinations); Clingan, supra note 111, at 497
(explaining the significance of requiring states to act "on the basis of' CLCS
recommendations); Karagianis, supra note 87, at 188-89; Oude Elferink, supra note 63,
at 280-81 (evaluating different proposals); Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 22
(1980) (describing the UNCLOS III negotiations over the wording change).
160.
See Oude Elferink, supra note 63, at 280 ("If the coastal state would then
still proceed to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf, this will not have been
done on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS.").
161.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(3) ("The continental margin
comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and
consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include
the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof."); supra notes 73-74
and accompanying text.
162.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 231.
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the United Nations pursuant to Article 76(9) of the Convention; such
limits "shall be" binding on third states if they do not object to the
163
legality of the limits within a reasonable time.
Category (d) cases might encompass various types of disputes.
Imagine that a CLCS recommendation fails to take a position on the
legality of a coastal state's straight baseline, and the complaining
state believes that an illegal straight baseline resulted in an outer
limits line that is farther offshore than would be the case if the
baseline followed (as it generally must when no straight baseline is
permissible) the low water mark of the coastline. 16 4 This situation
might exist because of the 350-mile cut-off that may apply-a cut-off
that must apply, in the case of submarine ridges. 165 Or imagine that
a complaining state objects to a coastal state's assertion of any
continental shelf off what the objecting state alleges is a rock that
"cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own. '166
Here, the objection to an outer limit line would be subsidiary to the
argument that the coastal state was not entitled to a continental shelf
at all. However, if the CLCS recommended outer limits off what the
complaining state contends is such a rock, then the coastal state
might argue that limits based on those recommendations were "final
and binding.' 1 67 The issue of whether the formation was a rock or an
island could thus arise in the context of a dispute related to outer
limits.
Perhaps, however, the complaining state simply believes that the
CLCS inaccurately interpreted Article 76 in its recommendations,
and the coastal state set its outer limits on the basis of those
recommendations. 168 Such Category (d) cases involve questions about

163.
See id. at 232-33 (discussing Article 76(9) procedures for setting permanent
limits on the continental shelf and when they can be challenged); Wolfrum, supra note
111, at 9-11. But see McDorman, supra note 63, at 315 ('final and binding' . . . refers
only to the submitting state in that the submitting state, having delineated its outer
limit of the continental shelf and that limit not being challenged by other states, cannot
subsequently change the location of its outer limit.").
164.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
165.
See id. art. 76(4)-(5). The CLCS may well not address the legality of
straight baselines. See, e.g., Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS],
Summary of Recommendations in Regard to the Submission Made by New Zealand 19
April 2006
162 (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/
submissionsfiles/submissionnzl. htm#Recommendations_
("The distance criterion
constraint line submitted by New Zealand is constructed by arcs at 350 M [nautical
miles] distance from the territorial sea baselines included in the Submission. The
Commission agrees with the procedure and methods applied by New Zealand in the
construction of this constraint line." (emphasis added)). Note, however, that application
of the arc of circles method will mean that there is often no difference between a 350mile limit drawn from straight baselines and a 350-mile limit drawn from the coastline
low water mark.
166.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 121(3).
167.
Id. art. 76(8).
168.
The CLCS recommendations should conform to Article 76:
The recommendations of the Commission should be formulated in such
a way that the coastal State can assess if these recommendations are in
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when deference is owed to CLCS interpretations of terms used in
Article 76-a point to which this Article returns in Part IV.A.4.
3.

Standing and the Invocation of State Responsibility in Interstate
Cases

Interstate disputes often involve a breach of an international
obligation, giving rise to state responsibility. 169 State responsibility
issues may be involved in a dispute over a coastal state's failure to
comply with the Convention's substantive or procedural requirements
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles from baselines. One state responsibility question is
which state or states may invoke the responsibility of a breaching
state. With respect to the topic of this Article, this question may be
phrased in terms of which state would have standing to claim that a
to
coastal state had illegally established an outer limits line by failing 170
requirements.
Convention
procedural
or
comply with substantive
This subsection briefly explores this standing issue.
The law of state responsibility addresses, inter alia, which
entities are owed an obligation and which states may invoke the
The International Law
responsibility of the breaching state.
Commission addressed the invocation of responsibility by a "specially
affect[ed]" state in its Articles on State Responsibility. 171 The
obligation breached must be owed to "[a] group of States including
that [specially affected] State, or the international community as a
The specially affected state must be "injured," i.e.,
whole. '172
"affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it from the
173
generality of other States to which the obligation is owed.'
A specially affected state may invoke the responsibility of a
coastal state for establishing outer limits in violation of the
Convention's substantive or procedural requirements. If a coastal
state has illegally determined the outer limits of its continental shelf,
another state could be specially affected in a range of situations. For
example, an opposite or adjacent state would be specially affected if a
coastal state set outer limits that impinged on the claimant state's

accordance with article 76. This assures the coastal State that, in
acting on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, it also
acts in accordance with article 76.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 231.
In maritime boundary determination cases between opposite or adjacent
169.
states, a dispute may exist absent any allegation of wrongful conduct on the part of a
state. See supra note 10 (defining "dispute").
170.
"Standing" is also sometimes equated to jurisdiction ratione personae.
MALcOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1072 (6th ed. 2008).
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
171.
Annex, art. 42(b)(i), U.N. Doc. 56/83/Annex (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Articles on
State Responsibility].
Id.
172.
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
173.
Acts, art. 42, Commentary 12, in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMISSION, pt. II, 31, 119 (2001).
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continental shelf. 174 A state would also be specially affected if it had
suffered harm as a result of its direct interest in exploring or
exploiting the resources of a portion of the Area impacted by an
excessive outer limit, or in sharing equitably in the benefits obtained
from economic activities in that portion of the Area. 175 A flag state
might also be specially affected if a coastal state were to arrest one of
its vessels for violating the coastal state's continental shelf
regulations just inside what the coastal state illegally claims as its
outer limits line; in such a case, the arrest, which would violate rules
of flag state jurisdiction, could be regarded as proximately resulting
from the coastal state's breach of Article 76.176
More controversial, however, is the question whether any stateeven if not specially affected-may assert an interest of the
international community in the common heritage of the Area and its
resources and could judicially challenge a coastal state's outer limits.
The International Law Commission has addressed the basic or
secondary rules applicable to this topic in Article 48 of its Articles on
State Responsibility, under the heading "Invocation of responsibility
by a State other than an injured State. '177 Other sources present this
issue in terms of obligations erga omnes and rights of actio
popularis.178 According to the Institut de Droit International, an
obligation erga omnes is
(a) an obligation under general international law that a State owes in
any given case to the international community, in view of its common
values and its concern for compliance, so that a breach of that
obligation enables all States to take action; or
(2) an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the
treaty owes in any given case to all the other States parties to the same
treaty, in view of their common values and concern for compliance, so

174.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 246.
175.
See Wolfrum, supra note 111, at 12-13; First Report, supra note 86, at 783;
Second Report, supra note 61, at 246 ('The existence of this interest in the resources of
the Area and these high seas freedoms can be considered to give individual States a
legal interest in the definition of the outer limits of the continental shelf.").
176.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 90, 110.
177.
Article 48(1) provides:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility
of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if:
(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that
State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the
group; or
(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a
whole.
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 171, art. 48(1). Under Article 48(2), the
claimant state may claim cessation of the wrongful conduct and reparation "in the
interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached." Id. art.
48(2).
178.
See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, InternationalDecision, 96 AM. J. IN'L L. 937, 937
(2002); Nelson, supra note 74, at 1251; James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, para.
34, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L., supra note 43.
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that a breach of that obligation enables all these States to take
179
action.

The Law of the Sea Convention's deep seabed common heritage
regime could be regarded as an obligation erga omnes, at least in the
sense of the Institut's second definition.' 8 0 Since the focus of a claim
would be a coastal state's breach of Article 76, the question is
whether the obligation owed to comply with Article 76 could be
regarded as an obligation erga omnes because of the implications of
the location of a coastal state's outer limits line for the common
heritage regime. If so, any party to the Law to the Sea Convention,
even if not specially affected, could "take action" or invoke the
responsibility of the breaching state. 8 1
The Institut de Droit
International regards one consequence of what it defines as an erga
omnes obligation to be the right of any state to bring a judicial
claim-a right of actio popularis-if it can satisfy a court's
jurisdictional requirements:
In the event of there being a jurisdictional link between a State alleged
to have committed a breach of an obligation erga omnes and a State to
which the obligation is owed, the latter State has standing to bring a
claim to the International Court of Justice or other international
judicial institution in relation to a dispute concerning compliance with
182
that obligation.

However, the doctrine of actio popularis has not yet been

generally recognized in practice, at least not when a treaty does not
specifically authorize its use (and the Law of the Sea Convention
contains no such specific authorization). 18 3 This reluctance perhaps
reflects concern that the doctrine could disrupt negotiated
settlements between a state in breach of its obligations and directly
injured states. Some authorities also have suggested that a court or

179.
Institut de Droit International, Resolution: Obligations Erga Omnes in
International Law art. 1, Aug. 27, 2005, available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/
navigschon2003.html [hereinafter IDI Resolution].
180.
See also Crawford, supra note 178, para. 34 (distinguishing obligations erga
omnes, in the sense of obligations owed to the international community as a whole,
from obligations owed to all states parties to a treaty).
181.
IDI Resolution, supra note 171, art. 2; see Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 188, art. 48.
182.
IDI Resolution, supra note 179, art. 3. According to Judge Rildiger
Wolfrum, Article 48(1)(b) of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility encompasses "the initiation of proceedings for a judicial settlement" and
is applicable to disputes over outer limits. Ridiger Wolfrum, The Role of International
Dispute Settlement Institutions in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf, in
MARITIME DELIMITATION 19, 30 (Rainer Lagoni & Daniel Vignes eds., 2006). Accord
Wolfrum, supra note 111, at 14 ("To deny States the possibility of taking action to
protect the interests of the international community in the international seabed Area
would render this common heritage principle devoid of any meaning.").
183.
The doctrine has been accepted rarely in practice, and then only where the
underlying treaty explicitly recognized a right of actio popularis. See Nelson, supra
note 74, at 1251 (noting trend in scholarly views towards acceptance of actio popularis);
Shelton, supra note 178, at 937-38 (discussing a 2002 African Commission on Human
and People's Rights decision that recognized actio popularis).
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tribunal should not rule on the legality of a maritime boundary
beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines-a decision that would have
inevitable implications for all states-if all states (or an international
institution reflecting the collective interest) are not before the
tribunal. 8 4 The arbitral tribunal in the Barbados-Trinidad and
Tobago maritime delimitation case appropriately disregarded this
objection.' 8 5 Taken literally, the suggestion could prevent essential
rulings on the legality of outer limits, even in cases brought by
specially affected states. Nevertheless, given the uncertainties about
how actio populariswould be received in practice, it seems most likely
that any interstate challenges over the legality of coastal state outer
8 6
limits would be brought by specially affected states.
4.

Judicial Interpretation of CLCS Findings and Scientific Data

Even if jurisdiction, access, and standing objections were
surmounted in interstate cases, other concerns would arise if a court
were called on to evaluate the legality of particular outer limits.

184.
The Court of Arbitration in the St. Pierre and Miquelon maritime boundary
delimitation case in dicta wrote that it was "not competent to carry out a delimitation
which affects the rights of a Party which is not before it." Delimitation of Maritime
Areas (St. Pierre and Miquelon) (Can. v. Fr.) para. 79, 31 I.L.M. 1145, 1172 (Ct. Arb.
1992). The Court of Arbitration viewed the "Party which is not before it" as the
international community:
Any decision by this Court recognizing or rejecting any rights of the Parties
over the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, would constitute a
pronouncement involving a delimitation, not 'between the Parties' but between
each one of them and the international community, represented by organs
entrusted with the administration and protection of the international sea-bed
Area (the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction) that has been declared to be the
common heritage of mankind.
Id. para. 78. See Boyle, supra note 53, at 46; Karagiannis, supra note 87, at 191;
Nelson, supra note 129, at 574 (calling the dictum "unnecessary"); Oude Elferink,
supra note 86, at 117-18; Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Judgment of Oct. 8, 2007) para. 319, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/filesl120/14075.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (noting
that "in no case may the line be interpreted as extending more than 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured; any claim
of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76 of
UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
established thereunder"). Compare the techniques used to accommodate the concerns
of third states in maritime delimitation cases involving adjacent or opposite states. See
generally Alex G. Oude Elferink, Third States in Maritime Delimitation Cases: Too Big
a Role, Too Small a Role, or Both?, in THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME-BUILDING 611

(Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman & Susan J. Rolston eds., 2009).
185.
Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
(Barb. v. Trin. & Tobago), 27 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 147, para. 368 (Annex VII Arb. 2006),
available at http:luntreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/caseslvolXXVII/147-251.pdf.
186.
Such cases could lead to rulings that illegal outer limits were "not
opposable" to a successful claimant state. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.),
1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); KANIYAN HOMI KAIKOBAD, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 72 (2000) (discussing non-opposability in the context of
interstate disputes related to actions on the part of international organizations).
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These concerns include: (1) the appropriateness of a court
reinterpreting scientific data (or considering new data) when the
CLCS has already assessed relevant data; (2) the difficulty of
learning relevant data; and (3) the competence of legal tribunals to
assess such data.
The first concern essentially implicates rule of law values.
Respect for the rule of law requires respect for the CLCS process and
for the accurate and consistent interpretation of substantive terms
used in Article 76. The Law of the Sea Convention not only
established relatively determinate criteria for setting outer limits but
also created a process for the CLCS to review scientific data and
apply Article 76 of the Convention. 8 7 Some terms, such as "oceanic
ridge" and "submarine elevation," are both legal and scientific and
88
may be construed using standard methods of treaty interpretation
8 9
and in light of changing scientific knowledge.'
The Convention
requires coastal states to follow Article 76, but implicitly does not
require that a state's outer limits necessarily reflect the best and
most current scientific consensus concerning the meaning of terms,
for Article 76(8) recognizes that boundaries set "on the basis of' CLCS
recommendations "shall be final and binding."'190
When, if ever, should a tribunal decision displace CLCS
interpretations of Article 76 terms that incorporate scientific
meaning? For example, suppose a coastal state has set limits based
on a CLCS recommendation incorporating the body's understanding
of the term "oceanic ridge" in a particular case. 191 When could a
complaining state challenge that understanding in an interstate case?
As Alex Oude Elferink and the International Law Association's
Committee on Legal Issues of the Continental Shelf have argued, it is
appropriate to revisit CLCS determinations only if the CLCS has
acted ultra vires or committed a "material" error, clearly
misinterpreting some legal provision. 192 It is only in such a situation
that a judicial challenge should be successful against a coastal state
that has set its outer limits "on the basis of' a CLCS recommendation
(i.e., in a Category (d) case). 193 Such a challenge would remain an

187.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
188.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 47, arts. 31-33
(providing general rules of interpretation, supplementary means of interpretation, and
rules of interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages). For an
excellent example of how legal interpretation sheds light on the meaning of "oceanic
ridge" and "submarine ridge," see Second Report, supranote 61, at 219-22.
189.
See Nelson, supra note 74, at 1243 (arguing that the Commission should
"take the evolution of these scientific and technical terms into account" and that the
LOS Convention concepts "were not intended to be static but by their very nature
evolutionary").
190.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8).
191.
See supra notes 73-74, 188-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of
how the CLCS understands the term "oceanic ridge."
192.
Oude Elferink, supra note 86, at 121-23; Second Report, supra note 61, at
248.
193.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 247-48.
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interstate case even if the dispute in a sense resulted from the
Commission's own inaccurate interpretation of a legal term. If a court
found that a CLCS recommendation inaccurately interpreted the law,
the coastal state could return to the CLCS, which should consider the
194
court's ruling in making any new recommendations.
Second, in challenging a coastal state's outer limits, it may also
be difficult or impossible for a complaining state and, by extension, a
court to learn about the data that the CLCS used to make its
recommendations and the coastal state relied on to establish its outer
The CLCS, sensitive to the need to maintain the
limits.
confidentiality of information submitted to it, conducts much of its
work behind closed doors. 195 A coastal state that did not disclose all
the data on which it based its decision to set its outer limits could not
force dismissal of a case, but-without full information-it is not
clear that a court could fairly evaluate whether an outer limits line
complied with Article 76 requirements. 196 "The lack of detailed
information on submissions to and recommendations of the CLCS
may make it difficult for other States to establish whether the coastal
State has in fact established the outer limits of its continental shelf
on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS."'1 97 Courts and
tribunals operating under the Convention may rely on experts, 198 but
these experts may also lack access to all relevant data.
Third, even if a court or tribunal could learn the data necessary
to assess whether an outer limits line complied with the requirements
of Article 76, it could be difficult for judges, even with the assistance
of experts, to fairly evaluate and apply complex scientific data. 1 99

194.
Id. at 248; First Report, supra note 86, at 788-89.
195.
Coastal states are only required to publish an executive summary of their
submissions, and the CLCS's evaluation of a coastal state's data is undertaken by a
seven-person subcommission whose deliberations are closed except to representatives
of the submitting state. The subcommission does, however, publish an executive
summary of its recommendations. Rules of Procedure,supra note 83, Annex III, 11(3);
see The Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement
by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the
Progressof Work in the Commission 10, Doc. CLCS/36 (May 2, 2003) (proposing an
executive summary with a general description and proposed coordinates of an extended
continental shelf). Furthermore, some coastal states have indicated that they may
share or unilaterally disclose the data justifying their outer limits. See Elizabeth
Riddell-Dixon, Canadaand Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension, 39 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 343, 351 (2008) (discussing collaboration among Canadian, Danish, and
Russian officials as well as officials in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
196.
See First Report, supra note 86, at 787 n.63 (discussing the difficulties of
incomplete information for courts).
Id. at 789.
197.
198.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 289. See also First Report, supra note
86, at 787.
199.
See David A. Colson, Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between
States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts, in LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF
CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS, supra note 69, at 287, 289 (describing the difficulty facing
the International Court of Justice in the Gulf of Maine case between Canada and the
United States). Colson explains that:
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When faced with the need to consider scientific and technical data,
international courts and tribunals disclaim the existence of any
formal bar to such consideration if necessary for a legal
determination. 20 0 However, if tribunals have to rule on such difficult
technical issues as the sedimentary thickness test of Article
76(4)(a)(i) or the meaning of the "foot of the continental slope" in
Article 76(4)(b), they may have to, in the words of the International
Court of Justice, "make a determination upon a disagreement
between scientists of distinction as to the more plausibly correct
interpretation of apparently incomplete scientific data. '20 1 If a court
is to assess the legality of a particular outer limits line, it may not be
able to escape the need to interpret scientific data, however, given the
traditional judicial function of applying law to facts.
In practice, the difficulties of addressing scientific and technical
data may limit formal judicial challenges to coastal states' outer
limits.
States that contemplate judicial proceedings under the
Convention's third-party compulsory dispute settlement provisions
will be aware of the aforementioned difficulties, which may retard the
bringing of outer limits claims.
Disputes in which the interpretation of complex scientific data is
not required may be more amenable to judicial proceedings, although
states often find it politically inappropriate to bring any judicial
claims against other states. Such cases could include Category (a)
claims that a coastal state has set limits without submitting data to
the CLCS, in which case the remedy would likely involve a ruling
that reinforces the coastal state's procedural obligations under the
Convention. Other cases might involve relatively manageable judicial
tasks, not requiring consideration of complex technical data, such as
challenges related to egregious straight baselines that a coastal state
has used for drawing 350-mile cut-off lines.
B. Contentious Cases Pursuant to Special Agreements
States may enter into special agreements to address specific
disputes related to the outer limits of the continental shelf. Article
282 of the Law of the Sea Convention contemplates states entering
agreements entailing binding decisions. 20 2 These agreements may

[1It appeared obvious to us on the United States team for the U.S.-Canada case
that the Court was in no position to decide competing scientific arguments. For
one reason, no law said which scientific facts were legally relevant. And, even
so, the Court had no capability to choose between opposing scientific
presentations. In other words, the Court could not make head-nor-tails out of
the competing natural prolongation arguments.

Id.
200.
First Report, supranote 86, at 787-88.
201.
Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 36 (June 3), quoted in
Nelson, supra note 129, at 588. See also Colson, supra note 199, at 287, 289.
202.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 282.
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replace the normally applicable third-party dispute settlement
provisions of Part XV of the Convention. 20 3 In practice, however, it
seems unlikely that a coastal state would agree to allow an
international court to hear an interstate dispute over the location of
its outer limits line, which is within its sovereign prerogative to setsubject to its own interpretation of international law. Nevertheless,
particular political circumstances might lead states to enter into a
special agreement, perhaps in conjunction with the resolution of a
disputed boundary they shared.
A coastal state also could, in theory, enter into a special
agreement with a non-state entity. Whether the CLCS could enter an
agreement with a coastal state providing for an advisory opinion
request is doubtful, in light of the limited mandate of the CLCS and
its characteristics. The CLCS is a technical body, and the expenses of
its members are defrayed by the states that have nominated them20 4;
there is no general source of funding to support the Commission's
involvement in international litigation. 20 5
The CLCS is an
international expert body or treaty "organ" subject to provisions of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations. 20 6 Not every international body has the authority to enter
into international agreements. 20 7 In sum, "it can be questioned
whether the participation of the CLCS as a party in proceedings
before a court or tribunal would be either desirable or practically
20°8
feasible in light of its nature and functions.
The possibility of an international agreement between a coastal
state and the International Seabed Authority is not similarly limited

203.
Accord id. Annex VI, art. 22. See also id. art. 288(2) (providing for
jurisdiction of courts or tribunals "over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Convention,
which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement").
204.
Id. Annex II,art. 2(5).
205.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations provides the secretariat for
the Commission, id., but CLCS operations are not supported by any general
assessment of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention or by any monetary
contributions from the United Nations. Two trust funds exist, one of which provides
assistance to Commission members from developing countries in order to defray the
costs they incur in attending Commission meetings, while the second provides
assistance, training and advice for developing countries in preparing and submitting
information to the Commission. See Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf [CLCS],
Voluntary Trust Funds (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcsnew/
commissiontrust funds.htm#55th; supra note 97.
206.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb.
13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. See Legal Opinion on the Applicability of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the Members of
the Commission, Doc. CLCS/5 (Mar. 11, 1998) (contending that CLCS is a treaty organ
and that its members can be considered "experts on mission for the United Nations" as
covered by Article VI of the Convention).
207.
See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11) (discussing the concept of
"international personality").
208.
Second Report, supra note 61, at 247 n.133; First Report, supra note 86, at
784 n.50.
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on the grounds that the ISA is a technical body. The Law of the Sea
Convention recognizes that the ISA has "international legal
personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes," 20 9 an
explicit recognition that is not accorded to the CLCS. The Convention
210
authorizes ISA involvement in certain contentious cases,
suggesting that judicial proceedings involving the ISA are not per se
precluded. However, the propriety of the ISA agreeing to participate
in a case related to outer limits of the continental shelf must be
doubted because the Convention leaves the setting of outer limits to
coastal states. 211 Furthermore, it is difficult to envision, as a political
matter, either coastal states or the ISA agreeing to submit a "dispute"
over outer limits to international adjudication or arbitration via a
212
special agreement.
C. Advisory Jurisdiction
Advisory proceedings could, in principle, offer some advantages
over contentious cases concerning the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines. States and other
international actors may, at least in theory, perceive advisory
proceedings to be less adversarial and less controversial than
Advisory opinion requests also follow
contentious cases. 2 13
negotiation of the precise phrasing of the question that a court or
tribunal is to address. Questions could thus present discrete and
even complex legal issues that do not require the evaluation and
application of scientific data. For this reason, a court or tribunal
to avoid the difficulties
exercising advisory jurisdiction may be able 214
involving scientific data noted in Part IV.A.4.
Different options should be considered for pursuing advisory
opinions relating to the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond
Three potential advisory jurisdiction
200 miles from baselines.
which
the Convention explicitly provides for,
forums, the latter two of

LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 176. See also Protocol on the Privileges
209.
and Immunities of the International Seabed Authority art. 3(1)(c), opened for signature
Aug. 17, 1998, 2214 U.N.T.S. 133.
210.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 187.
See supra notes 94, 140-41 and accompanying text.
211.
For discussion of the process of ISA approval of any legal proceeding, see
212.
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See Julie Calidonio Schmid, Note, Advisory Opinions on Human Rights:
213.
Moving Beyond a Pyrrhic Victory, 16 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 415, 415 (2006) (noting
that advisory opinions are "in theory less confrontational than contentious cases
because states are not parties and do not have to defend themselves against formal
charges").
Questions that relate to entitlement to a continental shelf-for example,
214.
questions about whether formations with certain characteristics do or do not meet the
requirements of an "island" that can support a continental shelf, or questions about the
legality of states having continental shelves off Antarctica-would probably not require
consideration of complex scientific data.
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are the International Court of Justice, the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the ITLOS, and the full ITLOS.
1.

Advisory Opinions in the International Court of Justice

The first advisory opinion option is the International Court of
Justice. The United Nations Charter and the Court's Statute provide
for this option. 215 The General Assembly or Security Council may ask
the ICJ to give an advisory opinion "on any legal question. '216 The
quoted phrase refers to legal questions under consideration within
the United Nations. 2 17 The Legal Counsel of the United Nations has
given legal advice concerning issues facing the Commission on the
The Secretary-General also
Limits of the Continental Shelf.2 18
reports regularly to the General Assembly on law of the sea matters,
and the Assembly considers the reports. 219 The General Assembly
might take an interest in clarifying legal issues relating to the
continental shelf. Since the ICJ has decided numerous law of the sea
cases, the General Assembly may well consider it an appropriate
220
forum for an advisory proceeding.
Even when the ICJ has competence to render an advisory
opinion, it retains discretion to refuse to do so. However, no reasons
appear likely to cause the Court to refuse to render an opinion on
legal issues that concern the international community such as those
related to the continental shelf and its outer limits. 22 1 If the question
presented in a request for an advisory opinion relates to concerns

U.N. Charter art. 96; ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 65.
215.
U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1. For an overview of the ICJ's advisory
216.
jurisdiction, see KAIKOBAD, supra note 186, at 51-62 (noting the extensive literature on
the topic). Article 96(2) of the Charter, which authorizes other U.N. organs and U.N.
specialized agencies, when so authorized by the General Assembly, to request advisory
opinions "on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities," is not relevant
to questions related to the outer limits of the continental shelf. Neither the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf nor the International Seabed
Authority, both of which were created by the Law of the Sea Convention, is a U.N.
organ or a U.N. specialized agency.
Rosalyn Higgins, A Comment on the Current Health of Advisory Opinions,
217.
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 567, 580 (Vaughn Lowe &
Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
218.
See, e.g., Legal Opinion on the Applicability of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to the Members of the Commission,
Doc. CLCS/5 (Mar. 11, 1998).
See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, delivered
219.
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/64/66 (Mar. 13, 2009), http://daccess-ods.un.org/
access.nsflGet?Open&DS=A/64!66&Lang=E.
See Budislav Vukas, The InternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea:
220.
Some Features of the New InternationalJudicial Institution, in THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 25, at 59, 67 (arguing that the ICJ has
"the right to give advisory opinions ... on legal questions related to the LOS
Convention and the law of the sea in general to all those who are generally entitled to
request such opinions from the ICJ").
See CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL
221.
TRIBUNALS 537-42 (2003) (explaining how liberally the ICJ has exercised its discretion
to give an advisory opinion, in fact never having refused to give a requested opinion).
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facing the international community, the fact that an advisory opinion
also may relate to a particular country's continental shelf should not
prevent a court from reaching the merits of the question. 222 If states,
acting through the General Assembly, could muster the political will
to request an ICJ advisory opinion, the resulting opinion, although
not legally binding, would widely be regarded as authoritative.
2.

Advisory Opinions in the Seabed Disputes Chamber

A second possibility is for the Assembly or Council of the
International Seabed Authority to ask the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to render an
advisory opinion that could help clarify outer limits issues. This
possibility is controversial. Article 187 of the Convention, which
directly addresses the jurisdiction of the Chamber, specifies that the
Chamber "shall have jurisdiction under this Part [XI] . . . in disputes
with respect to activities in the Area," i.e., with respect to "all
activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the
Area." 22 3 Does this jurisdictional provision restrict the scope of
available advisory proceedings, which are provided for elsewhere in
Part XI?
Article 187 addresses jurisdiction with respect to
disputes. 224 No article in the Convention explicitly addresses the
Chamber's advisory jurisdiction by using the word "jurisdiction," but
225
the Convention certainly envisages advisory proceedings.
As noted in Part II of this Article, the Assembly or Council of the
ISA may request an advisory opinion to consider "legal questions
arising within the scope of their activities," and the Seabed Disputes
Chamber "shall give" such opinions.2 26 If the Chamber "shall give" an
advisory opinion, the Chamber must have competence for that
purpose. Furthermore, the ISA Assembly may request that the
Chamber give an advisory opinion "on the conformity with th[e] [Law
of the Sea] Convention of a proposal before the Assembly on any
matter."227 Article 187 itself, which addresses jurisdiction in cases

222.
Cf. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (advisory
opinion involving right to self-determination despite Spain's argument that the matter
involved a bilateral dispute).
223.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 187, 1(3).
224.
Id. art. 187.
225.
Louis B. Sohn, Advisory Opinions by the InternationalTribunalfor the Law
of the Sea or Its Seabed Disputes Chamber, in OCEANS POLICY: NEW INSTITUTIONS,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 61, 66-68 (Myron Nordquist & John Norton Moore
eds., 1999).
226.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 191.
227.
Id. art. 159(10) (emphasis added). For background, see Sohn, supra note
225, at 62-68 (explaining how the advisory opinion provision was developed); Tullio
Treves, Advisory Opinions Under the Law of the Sea Convention, in CURRENT MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA,

supra note 99, at 81, 83-91 (providing general background on advisory proceedings
before the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Law of the Sea Tribunal). See
also LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, arts. 1, 14, 40; ITLOS Rules, supra note
27, arts. 130-137.
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involving disputes and then proceeds to list categories228of contentious
cases, does not limit the scope of advisory proceedings.
However, the range of issues that the ISA may legitimately
address is indeed limited. 229 This fact will affect how the Seabed
Disputes Chamber treats any request for advisory proceedings
relating to the outer limits of the continental shelf. Although the
phrases used to address the advisory jurisdiction of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber-"legal questions arising within the scope of their
[the ISA Council and Assembly] activities" (Article 191) and "the
conformity with this Convention of a proposal before the Assembly on
any matter" (Article 159(10))-suggest a broader range of issues than
does "activities in the Area" (Article 187), that range is still
limited. 230 The enumerated powers of both the Assembly and Council
are usually explicitly linked to "activities in the Area" and do not
include matters related to establishing the outer limits of the
continental shelf, which form the boundary of the Area. 231 For these
reasons, the ISA Assembly and Council could well refuse to seek an
advisory opinion. Furthermore, although the duty of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber to give advisory opinions "is absolute," that duty
"does not prevent the Chamber from giving as its opinion that the
question asked is not a legal question arising within the scope of the
activities of the requesting organ." 232 Some commentators reject the
possibility of the Seabed Disputes Chamber rendering an advisory
opinion that would appear to have implications for the location of the
233
outer limits of the continental shelf.
Still, much may depend on the characterization of an issue. Is
the issue that is the subject of the request for an advisory opinion

228.
Yokota, supra note 138, at 37.
Thomas A. Mensah, The Place of the InternationalTribunal for the Law of
229.
the Sea in the InternationalSystem for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 20, at 21, 27-28.
230.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 159(10), 187, 191; Joseph Akl, The
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 20, at 75, 84-86.
See LOS Convention, supra note 1, arts. 134(4), 157(2), 160, 162 (setting
231.
out the powers and function of both the Assembly and Council and noting (Article
134(4)) that "[n]othing in this article affects the establishment of the outer limits of the
continental shelf in accordance with Part VI'); 1994 Part XI Implementation
Agreement, supra note 1, Annex, § 1(1) ("The powers and functions of the Authority
shall be those expressly conferred upon it by the Convention" plus "such incidental
powers, consistent with the Convention, as are implicit in, and necessary for, the
exercise of those powers and functions with respect to activities in the Area."); supra
notes 139-41 and accompanying text. However, not every Convention provision
relating to the Authority's powers is explicitly linked to "activities in the Area." See,
e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 143(2) (providing that the Authority may
"carry out scientific research concerning the Area").
232.
6 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
COMMENTARY I 191.7(a) (Satya N. Nandan et al. eds., 2002).

SEA

1982: A

233.
See Nelson, supra note 129, at 577 ("If this line of reasoning is correct, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber will not be able to give an advisory opinion on such
delimitation issues."); Wolfrum, supra note 182, at 28-29.
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primarily about outer limits or really about ISA activities? 234 If the
latter, should the ISA be disabled from obtaining advice that would
help it fulfill its functions? The ISA may legitimately need to know,
for example, whether its efforts to promote marine scientific research
in the Area could provisionally apply (pending a coastal state's
establishing legal outer limits) to certain regions. 23 5 Although the
Chamber should not give advice about the precise location of outer
limits lines, its response to, for example, the legal characterization of
a particular seabed formation might help the ISA in conducting its
activities. 236
The fact that any advisory opinion would be
nonbinding-for the ISA as well as for states-suggests a lack of any
true interference with the Convention's mechanisms for establishing
outer limits.
3.

Advisory Opinions in the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea Pursuant to International Agreements

Third, as an alternative to a special agreement leading to a
contentious case, an advisory opinion might be sought from the
ITLOS pursuant to an international agreement "related to the
23 7
purposes of the Convention" to which a coastal state is a party.

234.

See Eiriksson, supra note 148, at 259. Eiriksson explains that:

[t]he key jurisdictional element is that the request must relate to the scope of
the activities of the Assembly or Council .... [H]ere we would not be at the
stage of actual or potential 'activities in the Area', a term with a specific and
defined meaning, but rather at a more general stage, and what could be more
relevant to activities of the organs of the Authority than disputes pertaining to
their potential geographical scope?
Id. For a good discussion of the importance of characterization in the law of the sea
context, see Boyle, supra note 53, at 44-46.
235.
The example relates to an issue area in which the ISA does have a grant of
authority, but which does not explicitly relate to "activities in the Area." According to
article 143(2) of the Convention:
The Authority may carry out marine scientific research concerning the Area
and its resources, and may enter into contracts for that purpose. The Authority
shall promote and encourage the conduct of marine scientific research in the
Area, and shall coordinate and disseminate the results of such research and
analysis when available.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 143(2). But see also 1994 Part XI Implementation
Agreement, supra note 1, Annex, § 1(5(h)) (mandating that "[bjetween the entry into
force of the Convention and the approval of the first plan of work for exploitation," the
Authority's focus will be "[piromotion and encouragement of the conduct of marine
scientific research with respect to activities in the Area" (emphasis added)).
236.
Because of the complexity of the issue of ridges, the CLCS will examine the
issue "on a case-by-case basis." Scientific and Technical Guidelines, supra note 74,
7.2.11. Under this approach, a request for an advisory opinion seeking a general,
abstract rule relating to such formations would not be appropriate.
237.
ITLOS Rules, supra note 27, art. 138(1) ("The Tribunal may give an
advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the
purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a
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This avenue is unusual, for the advisory jurisdiction of international
courts

typically

depends

on

requests

from

an

international

organization. 23 8 Consistent with Article 291(2) of the Convention,
international organizations and other "entities" may have access to
the ITLOS in cases "submitted pursuant to any other agreement

conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the
parties to that case. '23 9 The jurisdiction of the ITLOS in turn
"comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in
accordance with this Convention and all matters"-a word with
broader meaning than "disputes"-"specifically provided for in any
other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal. '240 Both
the ITLOS Statute, quoted above, and ITLOS Rule 138, which
authorizes advisory opinion requests pursuant to international
agreements, encompass agreements between states and international
24 1
organizations as well as interstate agreements.

request for such an opinion."). See Sohn, supra note 225, at 68-69; Treves, supra note
227, at 91-92.
238.
Schmid, supra note 213, at 415.
239.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 20(2). According to Judge
Ridiger Wolfrum of the ITLOS,
[t]he term "entities" is quite broad. It includes States which are not parties to
the Convention, entities listed in art. 305 of the Convention which have not
become parties to the Convention, international intergovernmental
organizations in addition to those referred to in art. 305, subpara. 1() and
Annex I, the Authority, including the Enterprise and its organs given they have
separate juridical personality, as well as natural or juridical persons.
Ridiger Wolfrum, The Legislative History of Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 63 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND

INTERNATIONALS

PRIVATRECHT

[RABELSZ.]

342,

345

(1999)

(F.R.G.).
240.
LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex VI, art. 21. According to ITLOS Rule
138, a "body" "authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the request
to the Tribunal" must request an advisory opinion, but this entity may include a state.
ITLOS Rules, supra note 27, art. 138. See THE RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 394 (P. Chandrasekhara Rao & Ph. Gautier
eds., 2006) [hereinafter ITLOS RULES COMMENTARY]. The Commentary explains that:

As to the meaning of the expression 'body', it appears that any organ, entity,
institution, organization or State that is indicated in such an international
agreement as being empowered to request, on behalf of the parties concerned,
an advisory opinion of the Tribunal, in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, would be a 'body' within the meaning of article 138, paragraph 2, of
the Rules.
Id. But see Treves, supra note 227, at 92 (suggesting that the Rule 138(2) requirement
that a request be made by "a body" conforms to "the basic concept that advisory
opinions are an instrument at the disposal of international organizations (although the
word 'body' suggests a rather broad approach to this concept) and not of States").
241.
See ITLOS RULES COMMENTARY, supra note 240, at 267 ("[A]greements
between . . . States and international organizations ....

would indeed be considered

'international agreements' for the purposes of article 138 of the Rules."); EIRIKSSON,
supra note 25, at 115. Rule 138 of the ITLOS Rules should be read in light of Article
288(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention (which refers to jurisdiction based on
"international agreement[s] related to the purposes of this Convention") and Articles 20
and 21 of Annex VI. As noted in the text above, Article 21 even more broadly allows
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As previously noted, this "international agreement" mechanism
for advisory jurisdiction applies to "matters specifically provided for
in the agreement," and Rule 138(1) emphasizes that the agreement
must "relate to the purposes of the Convention. '2 42 On their face,
these phrases could encompass jurisdiction with respect to an
instrument whereby the parties simply agreed to ask for advice about
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. Some authorities
suggest, however, that it may not be possible to raise questions
relating only to the Convention via this "international agreement"
mechanism; the mechanism was developed pursuant to Article 288(2)
of the Convention, which contemplated new substantive agreements
related to the law of the sea, not agreements that merely reiterated or
referred to Convention provisions. 24 3 Suppose, however, that two
adjacent coastal states agreed to conduct joint mineral exploration on
their continental shelves out to a proposed outer limits line. If these
states entered an interstate agreement providing for an advisory
opinion request about an issue relevant to the legality of that line,
that request could well concern "matters specifically provided for in
the agreement" that "relate to the purposes of the Convention," thus
Former Judge
providing a basis for an advisory opinion. 244
scenario,
suggesting
offered
another
Eiriksson
has
Gudmundur

jurisdiction of the ITLOS pursuant to "agreements," a term that could encompass
private party agreements or mixed, state-private party agreements. Whether these
Articles should be read so broadly has provoked controversy. Some commentators have
argued that Article 288 of the Convention limits jurisdiction to matters relating to the
Convention or "international agreements." See, e.g., GARCIA, supra note 8, at 550.
However, it is also plausible that the specific provision of Annex VI, Article 21, should
apply instead of Article 288, because Article 288 had to be phrased restrictively to
accommodate the more limited jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. See
ICJ Statute, supra note 17, art. 35 (only states may be parties in contentious cases
before the Court); Sohn, supra note 225, at 69 ("All international corporations that
have fought for such access for many years should find these provisions very useful.")
Wolfrum, supra note 239, at 346. See also 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
A.VI.117, A.VI.124 (Shabtai Rosenne & Louis B.
OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
Sohn eds., 1989) [hereinafter 5 LOS CONVENTION COMMENTARY]; Jfirgen Basedow, The
Law Applicable to the Substance of Private Litigation before the InternationalTribunal
for the Law of the Sea, 63 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ.] 361, 362 (1999) (F.R.G.) (explaining that the
limitation under Article 288 probably would not exclude the disputes of private parties
relating to maritime commerce.); Boyle, supra note 53, at 47-50, 52-54; Tullio Treves,
Private Maritime Law Litigation and the InternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea,
63 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT
[RABELSZ.] 350, 352-56 (1999) (F.R.G.). Whether a coastal state would ever enter into
an agreement with a private party related to outer limits is, however, highly unlikely.
In any event, to accommodate such a possibility the ITLOS would have to revise Rule
138 to allow advisory opinion requests pursuant to "agreements" rather than
"international agreements."
ITLOS Rules, supra note 27, art. 138(1).
242.
A.VI.115; First
243.
See 5 LOS CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 241,
Report, supra note 86, at 784.
244.
Cf. Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan), 39 I.L.M. 1359,
1387 (Annex VII Arb. 2000) (supporting the proposition that a dispute may arise under
both the Law of the Sea Convention and other agreements related to particular aspects
of the law of the sea).
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coastal states might enter an interstate agreement to "seek
clarification in order to more effectively make their claims" where a
number of outer limits are affected by provisions on submarine
ridges. 245 Some states have cooperated by making joint submissions
to the CLCS, and their cooperation could extend to seeking
clarification of disputed legal points via an international
agreement. 246 A decision of the ITLOS to render advice pursuant to
such a request would provide a valuable service to the parties.
As noted in Part IV.B, the functions of the CLCS probably
preclude its entering into an agreement with a coastal state. 24 7 This
limitation eliminates the possibility of an advisory opinion--one
source of authoritative legal advice for the CLCS. For example, if the
CLCS refused to accept a coastal state's assertion about an
application of Article 76, and the coastal state still regarded its claim
as legally supportable but did not want to risk setting limits that
contravened a CLCS recommendation, 248 then a state-CLCS
agreement authorizing an advisory opinion could lead to principled
advice enabling the CLCS or the coastal state to modify its
position. 249 An agreement providing for a request for an advisory
proceeding in such a situation could clarify points of contention and
250
would fit with the view that the CLCS is not an adversarial body.
From this perspective, it is unfortunate that CLCS-state agreements
to seek advisory opinions are most likely not available.
The concerns noted in Part TV.B about the ISA and special
agreements also apply in the context of international agreements
25 1
with the ISA concerning advisory opinions.
Among the options for advisory opinions relating to outer limits,
the most attractive may be that provided in the United Nations
Charter allowing requests by the General Assembly for advisory
opinions from the ICJ. Any advisory opinion requests submitted to
the Seabed Disputes Chamber from the Assembly or Council of the
ISA would have to acknowledge limits on the powers of those organs.
Such requests would have to take account of the fact that outer limits
determinations rest with coastal states following their submission of

245.
See Eiriksson, supra note 148, at 260.
246.
See Submissions, supra note 108.
247.
See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. In addition, an agreement
between the CLCS and a coastal state would probably concern an interpretation only of
the Law of the Sea Convention. As just noted, this fact could also preclude an advisory
opinion.
248.
The outer limits would then not be "final and binding" under Article 76(8)
and would "not be opposable to other States." Second Report, supra note 61, at 242.
249.
Although in theory the resubmissions to the CLCS will eventually lead to a
consensus between the coastal state and the CLCS, an agreement authorizing an
advisory opinion and the resulting advice could further the prospect of an
accommodation.
250.
Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of
UNCLOS Property Law (and What Is to Be Done about It), 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 241, 275
(2007).
251.
See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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data to the CLCS. 252 Advisory opinion requests to the ITLOS based
on an international agreement between states would probably have to
relate to the particular substantive matter that is the subject of the
agreement rather than solely to the Convention.

V.

CONCLUSION

Both the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and
coastal states have legal responsibilities with respect to the outer
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from
baselines. The CLCS, although a technical body, is charged with
making its recommendations concerning outer limits "in accordance
with article 76" of the Law of the Sea Convention. 253 Coastal states
operating under the Convention are bound to comply with the
These legal
Convention's provisions relating to outer limits.
responsibilities encourage us to ask what mechanisms are available
to help promote compliance with the Convention. The fact that legal
questions relating to outer limits involve some ambiguities also leads
us to consider what mechanisms can promote accurate and consistent
254
interpretations of those questions.
Third-party dispute settlement provides only limited possibilities
for promoting the reliability and legal accuracy of determinations
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf. Plausible
alternatives include advisory proceedings in the ICJ pursuant to
requests from the General Assembly and in the ITLOS pursuant to
interstate treaties.25 5 Advisory proceedings are attractive in part
because the questions posed could highlight discrete legal issues and
avoid the difficulties that international courts or tribunals may face
in evaluating complex scientific data. (An international court or
tribunal might also face such discrete legal questions in a contentious
interstate case.) No formal rule precludes states from presenting
technical questions about particular outer limits, although a court or
tribunal may find it difficult to obtain or evaluate scientific data
important to addressing those technical questions. 256 In sum, thirdparty forums might occasionally address legal questions about outer
limits.
Yet, despite the considerable increase in the number of
international judicial and arbitral decisions in recent years,
international courts and tribunals appear unlikely to become

LOS Convention, supra note 1, art. 76(8), Annex II, art. 7.
252.
Id. Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
253.
254.
In this symposium on the Arctic, it is worth emphasizing that, with respect
to the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines,
the Arctic is not a sui generis legal regime. Law of the Sea Convention rules and
procedures involving the CLCS and third-party dispute settlement bodies apply fully
with respect to issues concerning the Arctic.
See supra Part IV.C.
255.
See supra Part IV.A.4.
256.

2009]

DISPUTE SETTLEMENTAND CONTINENTAL SHELF OUTER LIMITS

1263

significant vehicles for promoting rule of law values with respect to
the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines. First, political and other practical obstacles (e.g.,
cost) will make international cases or advisory proceedings irregular
25 7
phenomena, even if they should be considered useful in principle.
Second, the most logical candidate to challenge legally questionable
coastal state outer limits lines that border on the Area-the
International Seabed Authority-is precluded from pursuing
contentious cases under the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions
for compulsory procedures, and the ISA Assembly or Council probably
could not obtain advice on outer limits questions via requests for
advisory opinions. 258
Third, the Convention's provisions for
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions do not authorize a
role for the CLCS in any third-party proceeding. 259 The limited
mandate of the CLCS suggests that it cannot enter international
agreements to seek binding decisions or advisory opinions. 260 Fourth,
and more generally, respect for the legal limitations on the
jurisdiction of international tribunals and the access of entities to
those tribunals (a rule of law concern 26 1), along with appropriate
deference to the functions of the CLCS, may preclude many cases.
Whether coastal states accurately apply the Law of the Sea
Convention with respect to outer limits beyond 200 nautical miles
from baselines will depend in large measure on factors other than
actual third-party proceedings.
The possibility of international
tribunal challenges may indirectly promote the reliability and
accuracy of coastal state determinations of outer limits, because even
the theoretical threat of legal proceedings can deter states from
taking actions that clearly contravene the Convention. It seems more
likely, however, that coastal state compliance with legal requirements
will also depend on diplomatic reactions from other states 26 2 and
state officials internalizing the attitude that legal conduct respecting
outer limits requires compliance with the procedural and substantive
requirements of the Convention. One encouraging sign is that states

257.
See supra Part IV.A, C.
258.
See supra notes 132-42, 211-12, 251 and accompanying text.
259.
See supra Part IV.A. 1.
260.
Because the CLCS must "make recommendations in accordance with article
76" of the Law of the Sea Convention, this technical body operates within the
framework of international law. LOS Convention, supra note 1, Annex II, art. 3(1)(a).
This connection to the law raises the question of whether the Commission should
operate in accordance with rule of law values. (Some of the values often associated with
the "rule of law" are not exclusive to legal institutions. For example, we expect even
"scientific" institutions to act consistently and independently, free from political
influence.) A full exploration of this question is beyond the scope of this Article, which
focuses on third-party dispute settlement. Suggestions for promoting such values at the
Commission deserve careful study. See also supra notes 50, 121-22 and accompanying
text.
261.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
262.
See McDorman, supra note 63, at 309-10.
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have, to date, expressed their willingness to Use the Convention's
CLCS process.

